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A crucial condition for the existence of a 	

 through bank loans is that
monetary policy should be able to change bank loan  This paper contributes
to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence from dynamic
panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balance-sheet
information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank reduces its
lending more sharply in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy measure, the lower
its ratio of short-term interbank deposits to total assets is. This result is robust
against a broad variety of changes in the specification. A dependence on its size can
be found only if explicitly controlled for this dominating effect and/or if the very
small banks are excluded. Overall, the evidence is compatible with the existence of
a 	

, although it is weakened by the banks´ liquidity management
JEL-code: C23, E52, G21
Keywords: monetary policy transmission, credit channel, dynamic panel data
Eine wesentliche Bedingung für die Existenz eines durch Bankkredite wirkenden
Kreditkanals ist, dass geldpolitische Maßnahmen das Bankkreditangebot verändern.
Dieses Papier trägt zur Diskussion über diese Fragestellung bei, in dem es empiri-
sche Evidenz aus dynamischen Panelschätzungen präsentiert, die auf Bilanzdaten
aller deutschen Banken basieren. Das Papier zeigt, dass die durchschnittliche Bank
ihre Kreditvergabe in Reaktion auf eine restriktive geldpolitische Maßnahme um so
stärker reduziert, je geringer der Anteil der von ihr gehaltenen kurzfristigen Inter-
bankdepositen an ihrer Aktivsumme ist. Dieses Resultat ist robust hinsichtlich einer
Vielzahl von Änderungen in der Schätzspezifikation. Eine Abhängigkeit der Re-
aktion von der Größe einer Bank kann nur dann festgestellt werden, wenn dieser
dominierende Einfluß der kurzfristigen Interbankdepositen explizit berücksichtigt
wird und/oder wenn die kleinen Banken von der Untersuchung ausgeschlossen
werden. Alles in allem ist diese Evidenz kompatibel mit der Existenz eine Kredit-
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∗
Based on the assumption of informational imperfections in financial markets, the 
	

 assigns an active role to the  of bank loans in monetary transmission.
The existence of such a transmission channel has major implications for monetary
policy. First, marginal cost and earning considerations are not the sole factors relevant
to investment and funding decisions, but additionally the availability of funds. Second,
the overall effect of monetary policy on aggregate expenditure can no longer be
completely characterised by a vector of price variables. It depends on additional
factors, such as the propensity to supply funds, the average degree of substitution
between different forms of funding, and the distribution of these substitution rates
among economic agents. Moreover, since the 	

increases the restrictive
impact of monetary policy compared to "traditional" transmission channels, the more
sharply declining income that accompanies it tends, other things being equal, to put
interest rates under downward pressure.
1 As a result, the interest-rate level alone may
be an insufficient indicator of the effects of monetary policy. Third, the 	


implies that the transmission process of monetary policy depends on the structure of
the financial system. This means that structural changes in the financial area may affect
monetary transmission. Moreover, this dependence implies that monetary policy may
affect economic agents asymmetrically, depending on the degree to which they suffer
from the relevant financial market imperfections.
2 Given the differences in the
financial systems across the euro-area countries, this dependence may also imply that
the euro-area’s monetary policy affects some countries more strongly than others.
3
                                                     
∗  I would like to thank Jörg Breitung, Michael Ehrmann, Dario Focarelli, Heinz Herrmann, Ulf v.
Kalckreuth, Anil Kashyap, Benoît Mojon, Daniele Terlizzese, Fabio Panetta, Philip Vermeulen and
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1 Bernanke, B.S./Blinder, A.S. (1988) focus on this aspect: Within an IS/LM framework they show that a
restrictive monetary policy measure does not only cause a leftward shift of the LM curve (which ceteris
paribus causes interest rates to rise) but also - via the 	

 a leftward shift of the IS curve
(which ceteris paribus causes interest rates to fall), as investment declines at a given income and a given
interest-rate level. The net effect of this restrictive measure on the level of interest rates is thus a priori
unclear.
2 Such asymmetric effects may also exist at the national level, e.g. with respect to regions (see Carlino,
G.A./DeFina, R.H. (1996) and Samolyk, K.A. (1994), which both relate to the US) or sectors (see Hayo,
B./Uhlenbrock, B. (1999) for Germany, Ganley, J./Salmon, C. (1996) for the UK and Dedola, L./Lippi, F.
(2000) for Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the US).
3 On this issue, see, for example, BIS (1995), Favero, C.A./Giavazzi, F./Flabbi, L. (1999), Dornbusch,
R./Favero, C.A./Giavazzi, F. (1998), Ramaswamy, R./Sloek, T. (1998) and Guiso, L. et al. (1999).- 2 -
Given such important practical implications, evidence of the existence of a 
	

 is, fundamentally, of great interest for the monetary policy making of the
Eurosystem. It may have a bearing on, for instance, the choice of possible monetary
policy indicators, on the interpretation of the movements of monetary aggregates and,
possibly, also on the creation of inflation forecasts.
This paper uses information from individual bank balance sheets and applies panel-
econometric techniques to exploit the heterogeneity among banks in order to undertake
an empirical analysis of the possible existence of a 	

 in Germany. In
respect of the previous literature, the present paper contains four innovations: (1) It
covers the entire banking population in Germany on an individual basis; (2) Bank-indi-
vidual seasonal patterns are explicitly taken into account; (3) Bank-specific income and
risk variables are used to improve the control for 
	 loan demand movements;
(4) the paper takes account of the institutional structure of the German banking system.
The main findings are that the average bank’s reaction to monetary policy does not
depend directly on its size, but rather on its share of short-term interbank deposits in
total assets. A significant size effect can be found only when controlling for this
dominating influence. This result is interpreted as evidence supporting the existence of
the 	

 although – given the dominating influence of short-term interbank
deposits – it can be described as being only of “second order importance”. Therefore,
the pattern of divergence in the reaction to monetary policy seems to be more
complicated than is usually assumed in large parts of the literature.
The present paper is structured as follows: The following section outlines the 
	

 theory and reviews the relevant existing literature. Section  III presents
descriptive evidence of bank loans in Germany and of the structure of the German
banking system. Section IV presents the estimation methodology and highlights the
assumptions underlying the hypothesis tests. After a description of the database and a
discussion of necessary data transformations (section V), the basic estimation results
are presented in section VI. Section VII presents the results of some robustness checks.
Section VIII presents the conclusions.
 
	
Figure 1 shows that – according to the 	

 theory – bank loan supply may






 and the 		
 	

 According to the balance sheet
channel, an interest-rate increase induced by monetary policy worsens the risk
characteristics of potential borrowers by reducing the present value of assets used as
collateral.
4 Such a reduction may be caused by an increase in the discount rate applied
to expected future payments and/or by a reduction in the expected payments
themselves via other transmission channels (e.g. the cost of capital and/or the exchange
rate channel). Since this argument relates to all forms of external funding, it also
applies to bank loans: Banks may reduce their lending in periods of restrictive






The "pecking-order hypothesis", which is closely linked to the balance sheet channel
through the assumption of asymmetric information in financial markets, states that
firms initially use up their internally generated funds before they ask for external
funding.
6 Since an (unexpected) interest-rate increase brought about by monetary
                                                     
4 An additional way might be by affecting the average probability of default, but this effect is not much
emphasised by the relevant literature.
5 The connection between a company’s balance-sheet appearance and its ability to obtain funds (or to bear
the associated costs) also forms the basis of what is known as the "financial-accelerator" approach,
according to which (irrespective of monetary policy considerations) cyclical fluctuations in the value of
assets eligible as collateral lead to a reinforcement of cyclical upward and downward movements.
According to the "financial-accelerator" approach, an economic slowdown tends to result in (i) a
deterioration in a company’s balance-sheet position, and thus in its scope for obtaining external funds and
(ii) in a weakening of its capacity to generate internal funds. Both factors lead to a reduction in corporate
expenditure and thus contribute to reinforcing the economic slowdown (see, for example, Bernanke,
B.S./Gertler, M./Gilchrist, S.(1996)).
6 See Myers, S.C./Majluf, N.S. (1984) and Fazzari, S.M./Hubbard. R.G./Petersen, B.C. (1988). For an



























(2) (1)- 4 -
policy may lead to an (unexpected) increase in the interest costs faced by enterprises –
where the size and time patterns of this effect depend on the maturity structure of the
outstanding debt and the degree of diffusion of interest-rate-related derivatives – their
ability for internal funding will, other things being equal, decrease as a result.
7 Ceteris
paribus, i.e. given constant expenditures, they will be forced to expand external
funding. A  monetary policy may thus have a positive effect on loan demand
 and thereby 
	 lending. In principle, however, this "perverse" effect should
become less important over time since an adaptation of expenditures is then to be
expected, resulting in a lower loan demand. This dependence of loan demand on
internal funds is known as the "cash-flow effect" and is the most convincing
explanation for the often-found positive correlation between the interest-rate level and
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DeBondt (1999b) panel analysis
Kakes & Sturm (2001) VECM






 assumes restrictive monetary policy to reduce the liquidity
of the entire commercial banking system or to make the procurement of liquidity
associated with lending more costly. Typically, it is assumed that non-banks withdraw
reservable deposits from banks because they reorganise their portfolios after a policy-
induced interest rate increase (i.e. money demand is assumed to decrease in response to
                                                     
7 See, for example, Gertler, M./Gilchrist, S.(1994), esp. p. 311.
8 See, for example, Müller, M./Worms, A. (1995) for descriptive evidence. Impulse responses with such an
intial positive reaction of loans to a restrictive monetary policy shock can be found in Bernanke,
B.S./Gertler, M. (1995), particularly page 44, for the US, and in Worms, A. (1998) for Germany.








a restrictive monetary policy). If this reduction in deposits cannot be neutralised by
increasing other liabilities vis-à-vis non-banks or by reducing assets other than bank
loans, it will decrease a bank's ability to grant loans, i.e. monetary policy will change
loan-supply.
So far, empirical evidence of a 	

 in Germany is inconclusive, irrespective
of methodology or of the type of data used (see table 1). While Tsatsaronis (1995),
Stöß (1996), Guender & Moersch (1997), Favero, Giavazzi & Flabbi (1999) and
Küppers (2001)
9 do not find a 	

 in Germany, Worms (1998), deBondt
(1999a, 1999b), Kakes & Sturm (2001) and Hülsewig, Winker & Worms (2001) find
evidence in support of a 	


This ambiguity in the results reflects the fundamental problem of empirical research on
this issue: the identification of monetary-policy-induced shifts in loan supply. To
tackle this identification problem, the early empirical studies on the 	


looked at the timing of macroeconomic variables, such as the money stock and/or real
GDP. An example is that of testing whether aggregate deposits (monetary aggregates)
or aggregate bank loans provide a better forecast of future income. This approach is
based on the assumption that, given that bank loan  plays an active role in
monetary policy transmission, bank loans should react initially following a monetary
policy measure and that only afterwards would (deposits and) GDP move. Conversely,
if changes in the volume of bank loans are due mainly to demand effects, (the volume
of deposits and) GDP should react initially and only then bank loans.
10
Nevertheless, the finding that deposits have a higher predictive power for future GDP
than loans is also compatible with an active role of bank loan  in monetary
transmission: Frictions such as contractual commitments and/or credit lines imply that
the supply of bank loans, i.e. an asset position of the bank balance sheet, cannot react
as quickly to monetary policy measures as the volume of deposits, i.e. a liability
position. Even if there were no structural dependence between deposits (i.e. the money
stock) and GDP, but merely between the supply of bank loans and GDP, it would have
to be expected for this reason that the predictive value of deposits is higher than that of
bank loans solely on account of the lead time of the former.
11
                                                     
9 In his conclusion, Küppers (2001) interprets his own results as being in favor of the credit channel
theory. But, this conclusion is based on impulse-response functions with very large confidence intervals.
10 See, for example, King, S.R. (1986), Romer, C.D./Romer, D.H. (1990) and Ramey, V. (1993).
11 See Bemanke, B.S. (1993) and Gertler, M./Gilchrist, S. (1994).- 6 -
The discussion in the past ten years or so has shown that movements in the aggregate
volume of loans may essentially be interpreted both as supply and demand induced.
For that reason, the empirical  	

 literature also analyses microdata 
balance-sheet data of individual banks and/or enterprises, for example  or data that
were aggregated merely to the level of certain groups of economic agents.
12 This
strategy is based on the idea that, if the theoretical foundations of the 	

are
valid, certain economic agents should react more strongly to monetary policy measures
than others. More specifically: if a bank´s reaction to monetary policy depends on a
bank-individual factor that is related to loan supply and not to loan demand, then a
differential loan reaction across banks that depends on this factor indicates a loan
supply effect of monetary policy.
13 Typically, bank size is used as the identifying
variable. This idea is based on the assumption of severe information difficulties
implying that small banks have more problems than large banks in attracting funds.
Therefore, small banks should be forced to reduce their  of loans more sharply
than large banks in periods of restrictive monetary policy. Hence, the empirical result
that the volume of loans of small banks reacts more strongly than that of large banks is
perceived as an indication of the existence of a loan  effect induced by monetary
policy. This empirical test does not require a control for shifts in (the level of) the
demand for funds  which is necessary in the case of aggregate data  but only a
control for possible 
	 shifts in the demand for funds across banks. Typically,
it is therefore assumed that monetary policy does not lead to a differential loan demand
reaction across banks.
Table 2 provides an overview of the major empirical literature on the bank lending
channel based on microdata from bank balance sheets.
14 This shows which identifying
variables were used in the cited papers to solve the supply-demand identification
problem. Besides bank size, the degree of liquidity and capitalisation are also used (see
column "identification assumptions with regard to loan supply"): The underlying
assumption is that a bank's loan supply reacts all the more strongly to a monetary
policy measure, the smaller it is and/or less liquid it is and/or the weaker its
capitalisation is.
                                                     
12 For an overview, see, for example, Cecchetti, S. (2001).
13 See, for example, Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C./Wilcox, D.W. (1993) and Gertler, M./Gilchrist, S. (1994).
14 There is another strand of literature, which is based on data on individual enterprises rather than
microdata on banks. With regard to Germany, see Kalckreuth, U.v. (2001). See also Kremp, E./Stöss,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- 7 -- 8 -
This possibility of identifying supply movements comes with a drawback, however.
When using only disaggregated data it is no longer possible to directly measure the
level effect of the  	

 (or its relative importance to other transmission
channels) without making further assumptions. Hence, microdata is mainly used for
testing only the first of the two necessary conditions for the existence of the 
	

, which are (see (1) and (2) in figure 1):




	 (at least for some economic agents).
(1) has the effect that, following a restrictive monetary policy measure, (at least some)
borrowers are faced with a reduced  of bank loans. (2) implies that this has an
impact on their expenditure behavior. Although (2) is held to be less controversial in
the literature
15, when interpreting the results of the present paper it should nevertheless
be borne in mind that they cannot be regarded as strict evidence for or against the
existence of a 	

 The present paper, instead, concentrates on assumption
(1). It is possible, for instance, that the central bank is indeed able to reduce the supply
of bank loans by means of a restrictive monetary policy measure, but that (2) does not
hold empirically. In that case, economic agents can easily compensate for a reduction
in their banks´ supply of loans by increasing the use of other financial resources, say,
by expanding trade credit, the issuance of negotiable instruments, or loans from other
banks.
It is instructive for the preceding econometric analysis to look more closely at the role
of non-banks´ deposits. Figure 1 shows that – according to the 	

theory –
bank loan supply is affected by monetary policy in terms of altering the risk
characteristics of potential borrowers and/or non-banks' deposits held with banks.
Therefore, it is only for one part of the  	

, namely the bank lending
channel, that a monetary-policy-induced reduction of deposits is a necessary condition.
On the macroeconomic level, such a reduction of non-banks' deposits in reaction to a
restrictive monetary policy action is well documented in the empirical money demand
literature.
16 While such an aggregate reduction in deposits is necessary for the bank
lending channel to work, it is not a necessary condition that deposits react differently
across banks. Even if a possible differential reaction with bank loans comes from the
bank lending channel (and not the balance sheet channel), it does not have to be caused
                                                     
15 See, for example, Freixas, X./Rochet, J.-C., p. 165.
16 For a general overview and results for the euro-area, see, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank (2001b)
and Brand, C./Cassola, N. (2000). Specifically for Germany, see, for example, Scharnagl, M. (1998).- 9 -
by a differential reduction in deposits: Banks may nevertheless be forced to reduce
their lending differently, because they differ in their ability to offset a homogenous
reduction in deposits (for example, due to differences in their ability to raise other
means of finance or to reduce some of their other assets).
Therefore, this paper does not explicitly analyse whether monetary policy causes
differential effects on deposits across banks but concentrates instead on differential
effects on bank loans. Such an analysis would go beyond the question analysed in this
paper, which looks for loan supply effects of monetary policy. Given the existence of a
differential effect of monetary policy on bank loans, such an analysis of deposits could
yield additional information on what may cause such an effect. Analysing this question
is left to future research.
 /		$$	
There are specific features of the German financial system that may be important when
analysing the  	

 One is that the volume of bank loans to firms and
households increased relative to GDP during the 1990s: Starting from 50 % for firms
and 27 % for households (incl. non-profit organisations) in 1991, these ratios reached
60 % (firms) and 44 % (households) in 2000. Other things being equal, this indicates a
growing potential for a 	

 that works through bank loans.
Another key feature is that bank loans are a very important means of finance in
Germany: households raise funds to finance consumption exclusively in the form of
loans, with bank loans making up nearly 94 % as at the end of 1998.
17 Moreover, the
share of loans from domestic banks in firms’ external financing on average over the
years 1991-2000 amounted to around 36 % (securities: 15 %, equity: 21 %).
18 But, this
share has decreased substantially over time: from an average of 48 % between 1991
and 1993 it fell to almost 37 % between 1997 and 1999.
This overall declining trend is the result of an ongoing securitisation process. However,
it is important to mention that this trend is almost entirely due to the financing behavior
of the very large firms: Figure 2 shows the ratio of bank loans to the balance-sheet total
for firms of different size groups.
19 This ratio has increased for small and medium-
sized firms. The only group for which this ratio has not increased is the group of very
                                                     
17 See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), p. 34.
18 See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank (2000). Note that these numbers are based on flow data.
19 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2001c).- 10 -
large firms: Here, the ratio decreased from 9 % in 1991 to 8 % in 1998. This indicates
the growing importance of bank loans as a means of external finance for the large
majority of small and medium-sized German firms, which are therefore of special
interest for the 	


Table 3 presents some key
numbers on the structure of
the German banking system.
The upper part of the table
shows that credit
cooperatives make up 70 %
of all the institutions,
whereas the savings banks
make up about 18 %
(column 1). The "other
banks"  – consisting
primarily of the big banks
("Grossbanken"), the head
institutions of the savings
bank sector and of the
cooperative sector, the
foreign banks and the
private banks – represent
only around 12 %. Despite
this comparatively small
number of institutions, this
latter group holds almost
three-quarters of all bank
assets, while the many
credit cooperatives together
hold only 10 % (column 3).
In terms of the institutions'
importance with respect to










1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
...DM 25 million and more
but less than 50 million
%
...DM 50 million and more
but less than 100 million
...DM 10 million and more
but less than 25 million
...DM 5 million and more
...less than DM 5 million
Enterprises with an annual turnover of...
...DM 100 million and more
	0		,	*
1
∗ A comparable group of enterprises from the producing sector,
wholesale and retail trade and transport.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, September 2001.




The savings bank´s sector and the cooperative sector could both be described as being
relatively closed systems:
21 As far as their interbank relationships are concerned, the
cooperative banks and – to a lesser degree – the savings banks transact mainly with the
central institutions of their own system (which are the 	
	

 in case of the
savings banks and the cooperative central banks in case of the cooperatives): The
savings banks hold almost three-quarters of their interbank assets vis-à-vis their central
institutions (December 1998). In the case of the credit cooperatives, this share even
amounts to 92 %. Accordingly, savings banks and credit cooperatives hold only a small
share of their interbank assets vis-à-vis banks outside their own system. Instead, the
central institutions hold about 54 % (	
	

) and about 42 % (cooperative
central banks) vis-à-vis domestic banks that do not belong to their own system. Both
                                                     
20 These figures differ slightly from the data published in the Supplement to the Bundesbank Monthly
Report (Banking Statistics) because a small number of banks was excluded in a data screening process.
21 For a description, see Upper, C./Worms, A. (2001a), especially tables 2a and 2b, and Ehrmann,
M./Worms, A. (2001).
total assets









distribution of total assets











FROXPQ 12 345 67 8
7RWDO￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 594 1,780 18 997 27 56 3.0 4.4
credit coops 2,256 1,017 10 599 16 59 0.5 1.0
“other banks” 378 7,252 72 2,093 57 29 19.2 57.7
!￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 3 0 0 0 0 67 0.1 0.0
credit coops 753 65 1 38 1 58 0.1 0.0
“other banks” 51 3 0 1 0 39 0.1 0.0
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 21 7 0 4 0 62 0.3 0.1
credit coops 734 170 2 101 3 60 0.2 0.1
“other banks” 52 13 0 5 0 38 0.2 0.1
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 133 99 1 57 2 58 0.7 0.2
credit coops 600 357 4 222 6 62 0.6 0.2
“other banks” 74 49 1 19 1 39 0.7 0.2
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 437 1,675 17 936 25 56 3.8 4.9
credit coops 169 424 4 238 6 56 2.5 2.9
“other banks” 201 7,188 72 2,068 56 29 35.8 75.4
!￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿
￿RQO\￿‡RWKHU￿EDQNV·￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- 12 -
systems therefore incorporate some sort of ’’internal interbank market", with the central
institutions providing their respective systems’ links to the outside.
Table 3 additionally contains information on the size structure of the German banking
system. The grouping is based on quartiles of the distribution of total assets across
all banks, resulting in four groups of equally large size (in terms of the number of
banks). 93 % of the credit cooperatives belong to the three groups of smaller banks,
and the fourth group mainly consists of savings banks (54 %) and "other banks"
(25 %). This group of the largest 807 banks comprises 92 % of the total assets of all
banks (column 3), with an average bank size of about DM 11.5 billion (column 7).
Additionally, the percentile from 99 % to 100 % is indicated separately (bottom row).
These 32 largest banks – among which there are no credit cooperatives or savings
banks – hold a sum of total assets which comprises more than half of the total assets of
all banks (column 3). With an average size of more than DM 170 billion, they are more
than 50 times bigger than the average over all banks (column 7). It is interesting,
however, that their share of lending in total assets, at an average of 27 % is much lower
than that of the smaller banks, and even much lower than that of the top quartile of
the largest banks to which they likewise belong (column 6).
More generally, lending business to domestic private non-banks seems to be of much
greater importance for the small and medium-sized banks, i.e. for credit cooperatives
and for savings banks, than it is for the large banks: On average, almost 60 % of the
total assets of the three groups of smaller banks are loans to domestic private non-
banks, while this share amounts to only 35 % in the case of the large banks. This high
share in the case of the smaller banks is the result of a steady increase during the 1990s
(1991: 53 %), while, in fact, this ratio decreased for the large banks during the same
period (1991: 41 %).
Therefore, parallel to the growing importance of bank loans as a means of finance for
small and medium-sized private non-banks during the 1990s, loans became more
important as an asset mainly for the small and medium-sized banks. These obser-
vations are compatible with the notion that loans to households and small and medium-
sized firms are mainly supplied by the small and medium-sized banks. Unfortunately,
the available data do not contain information on individual borrowers, so that it is not
possible to exactly determine the variation of loan-customer size across banks.
However, based on the breakdown of loans into certain borrower groups, it appears
that savings banks and credit cooperatives give a greater share of their assets in the- 13 -
form of loans to those borrowers that can be assumed to be small or medium-sized on
average: At the end of 1998 more than 42 % of the loans of the saving banks and more
than 47 % of the loans of the credit cooperatives were granted to individuals, compared
with less than 14 % (savings banks) and 11 % (credit cooperatives) to domestic
enterprises. By contrast, the "other banks" on average hold less than 14 % of their
loans vis-à-vis domestic individuals and 15 % vis-à-vis domestic enterprises.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that small and medium-sized firms and
households are more likely to obtain loans from savings banks and credit cooperatives
than from the "other banks" (although this hypothesis cannot be strictly tested with the
available data).
22 For that reason, they are of particular interest with regard to the 
	

 The large volumes of loans of the large banks are probably mainly due to the
fact that they give major individual loans to large enterprises which, however, have a
number of other financing instruments available to them as a substitute for bank loans,
and are therefore of less interest for the 	

 (see condition (2) in figure 1).
5 		
Given the problems of identifying monetary-policy-induced loan  shifts with
macrodata, the empirical analysis in this paper is based on quarterly individual bank
data. According to the 	

 theory, the informational imperfections in the
financial markets that create bank loan supply effects of monetary policy also result in
differential loan supply responses across banks. The underlying assumption is that it is
more difficult for a bank to offset the effects of a restrictive monetary policy measure,
the higher the degree to which it suffers from asymmetric information vis-à-vis its
suppliers of funds. In the literature, bank size is the most commonly used indicator of a
bank's ability to generate outside financing: The idea is that small banks have more
difficulties in raising funds because they face higher information costs, and therefore a
higher external finance premium, than large banks. Hence, they are less able to offset
contractionary monetary policy measures and have to reduce their loan supply more
strongly than large banks in this case.
23
Another indicator that has been used in the literature is a bank´s capitalisation.
24 The
idea is based on the argument that a higher capitalisation makes a bank less prone to
                                                     
22 For the US, see Hubbard, G.D. (2000).
23 See, for example, Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C. (2000, 1995).
24 See, for example, Kishan, R.P./Opiela, T.P. (2000) and Peek, J./Rosengren, E.S. (1995).- 14 -
moral hazard and asymmetric information problems vis-à-vis its suppliers of funds.
Therefore, the external finance premium of a well capitalised bank should be smaller
than that of a poorly capitalised one. This implies that less capitalised banks should be
forced to restrict their lending more strongly in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy
measure than well capitalised banks.
But, there are fundamental problems with using capitalisation to identify possible loan
supply effects of monetary policy. One is that banks may hold higher amounts of
capital because they are more risky. Therefore, a bank's capitalisation (also) mirrors the
riskiness of its loan portfolio. As information on risk-adjusted capital requirements is
not publicly available, the interpretation of results based on capital as it appears on the
banks' balance sheets remains unclear. Moreover, the period under consideration
(1992-1998) is characterised by a declining trend in the short-term interest rate which
amounts to a more or less steady easing in the stance of monetary policy. In such a
period, a well capitalised bank can more easily  	
 its loans compared to one that is
restricted by capital requirements. This should lead to a positive dependence of a
bank's reaction to monetary policy on its capitalisation – which is also the result
predicted by the 	

. However, this argument cannot be applied directly to




Therefore, rather than capitalisation, bank size is the preferred indicator of the degree
to which a bank suffers from informational problems, since size is less biased by other
factors. Accordingly, the test for the existence of a 	

 should be mainly
based on bank size and not on capitalisation. Nevertheless, some regression results
based on capitalisation are also presented below, but without further interpretation.
This is done mainly to create comparability with studies that have used such an
indicator for the identification of monetary policy's loan supply effects.
A bank's degree of liquidity may also play a role in determining its reaction to
monetary policy measures, because a bank should be more able to shield its loan
portfolio from a restrictive monetary policy measure, the more liquid assets it can draw
on.
25 However, liquidity (like capitalisation) may be endogenous with respect to the
factors for which it should serve as an indicator: Those banks that suffer most from
informational imperfections will probably also hold large stocks of liquid assets. In
addition, we cannot exclude the possibility that more liquid banks are more risk-averse
                                                     
25 See Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C. (2000).- 15 -
and, therefore, also have tighter lending standards. If this is the case and there are
differences in loan demand between risky and less risky firms in response to a
monetary policy shock, liquidity also does not serve well as the discriminating variable
for identifying supply effects.
Therefore, the general strategy of the subsequent empirical analysis is to test for a
differential response of bank loans to monetary policy across banks of different size.
Despite the above-listed problems with using capitalisation and liquidity as indicators
to identify loan supply effects, we do not exclude the possibility that these variables
have an influence on a bank´s reaction to monetary policy. The test will be performed
by applying dynamic panel-estimation techniques to the following single equation,
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!Q￿W is the stock of loans to domestic private non-banks of bank 
 in quarter  ( ∆
indicates first differences), W is the indicator of monetary policy and ε Q￿W is the error
term. 6Q￿W is a matrix of bank specific variables that serve to capture determinants of
loan movements that are not caused by monetary-policy-induced shifts in loan supply.
Equation (1) allows for a bank specific fixed-effect, i.e. a bank-specific constant α Q
(which amounts to a bank-specific trend in !Q￿W).
A bank´s loan reaction to monetary policy is assumed to depend linearly on the bank-
characterising variable 	 (which could be size, liquidity or capitalisation) and is
therefore allowed to vary across banks and over time. This linear dependence is
captured by the “interaction terms” ( ) N W N W Q  	 − − ⋅ ∆ , . 	 is also included in a non-
interacted fashion in order to prevent possible direct effects of this variable on ∆ log!Q￿W
being captured by the "coefficients.
The long-run coefficient of the interaction term can be used to test for the presence of
loan supply effects of monetary policy if all other variables of the estimation equation
sufficiently capture (differential) loan movements caused by loan demand or caused by
loan supply factors other than monetary policy. If, in this case, the long-run coefficient
                                                     
26 For more details, see Ehrmann, M. et.al (2001).- 16 -
of the interaction term is not statistically different from zero, then there is no
differential loan reaction to monetary policy across banks, i.e. the proposed
methodology is unable to identify loan supply effects of monetary policy.
Since the hypothesis test consists of looking for 
 in the loan reaction of
banks, it is useful to completely eliminate the overall effect of pure time variables (for
example, the business cycle, the level of interest rates, inflation, etc.) on ∆ log!Q￿W. This
is most effectively done by including a complete set of time dummies W. While this is
accompanied by the drawback that the (average) level effect of monetary policy is also
captured by these dummies, i.e. that W cannot be included as such, it guarantees a
perfect control for the time effect on the endogenous variable and thereby enhances the
power of our hypothesis test.
27 Moreover, (1) can then be interpreted as the reduced
form of a broad variety of structural models that differ only in respect to the number
and the choice of included time series variables, because the use of W implicitly
captures the effect of all (combinations) of them.
6Q￿W consists of (the logarithm of) a bank-individual income variable, Q￿W, and (the
logarithm of) a bank-individual default-risk measure, Q￿W. The income of bank 
´s
loan customers Q is approximated by an average of sectoral real incomes (of nine
production sectors and the private households), with sector #´s real income 
M being
weighted by this sector´s share in bank 
´s loan portfolio (for detailed definitions of the
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The bank's default risk is approximated by Q￿W, which is a sectoral average of the
number of insolvencies. Sector #´s insolvencies 
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27 While the use of time series instead of a set of time dummies weakens the power of the test for a
differential reaction to monetary policy across banks, it allows for assessing the (average) level effect of
monetary policy. Estimations with time series are presented below, in section VII (see also Ehrmann et al.




 a monetary-policy-induced interest-rate increase
may, in principle, reduce loan supply by (a) (endogenously) increasing the average
probability of default. and (b) by lowering the amount paid to the bank in case of a
(exogenous) default, where, typically, net worth serves as the indicator for this amount
(see figure 1). Including Q￿W as an explanatory variable may capture a possible
differential reaction of banks´ loan supply to monetary policy caused by (a), which
would otherwise be captured by the interaction term in equation (1). Therefore, the
inclusion of Q￿W may lead to an underestimation of possible loan supply effects of
monetary policy by the interaction term. However, in accordance with most of the
relevant literature, I assume below that the effect of monetary policy on Q￿W is only
of minor relevance (in comparison with the influence of exogenous changes in default
risk on loans).
A priori, it is unclear how loan growth depends on changes in Q￿W and Q￿W in the short
run: If the “cash-flow effect” dominates in the short-run, the coefficients of the lower-
order lags of Q￿W should be negative: In this case, a reduced income worsens the ability
to finance expenditures internally and thereby leads to an increase in the 	
 for
external finance, given that expenditures are relatively fixed (which is realistic in the
short-run). A similar argument could apply to the risk variable: If the default risk of the
loan portfolio increases, the bank may increase loans in order to enable firms to solve
their liquidity problems and in order to meet a possibly increasing demand for loans.
The coefficients of the lower-order lags of Q￿W should be positive in this case.
However, despite this ambiguity with respect to the coefficient signs of Q￿W and Q￿W in
the short run, the signs of their long-run coefficients are unambiguous and can
therefore be used as a device to judge the adequacy of the estimation results: the long-
run coefficient of the income variable should be positive and that of the default-risk
variable should be negative.
The bank-specific fixed-effect α Q in equation (1) takes the form of a bank individual
constant. In order to be able to estimate an equation with $ such varying constants,α Q
is removed from the estimation equation by taking first differences of (1).
28 Owing to
                                                     
28 Another way of eliminating the fixed effect is to substract individual means (“within-transformation”).
Usually, taking first differences is preferred in the literature, because the instrumentalisation with lagged
variables in a within transformation needs a much stronger exogeneity assumption than is the case for first
differences: If the model is written in first differences, all past values (with more than two lags) of any
weakly exogenous variable are valid instruments. In particular, (twice) lagged levels and differences are
valid in this context as long as the original disturbance is not serially correlated. If the model is written in
deviations from individual means, the new disturbance comprises all past, present and future values of the- 18 -
the dynamic nature of the model, however, this creates a correlation between the
lagged-endogenous variables and the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent
OLS estimates.
29 Therefore, the GMM method proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991)
will be applied subsequently.
30 Here, the lagged levels of the regression variables are
used as instrumental variables.
































100 .( 4 )
	Q￿W is the sum of those assets that can easily be liquidated by the bank and mainly
consists of cash and balances with the central bank (7 % on average across all banks
and periods), short-term interbank deposits (32 %), debt securities (58 %) and shares
(3  %, for more information, see also appendix 1).The capitalisation variable is
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All three bank characteristics are demeaned in order to obtain 	 variables with a
sum across all included observations of zero. This guarantees that the ")s in equation
(1) are not influenced by the level effect of  on loan growth In case of the size
variable (equation (6)), the time-varying mean across all banks is substracted from the
log of total assets of bank 
This removes the overall trend in the log of total assets
from (, indicating that the size of a bank relative to the average size across all banks
	 	 
  is the relevant measure. This leads to a ( variable that is, on
                                                                                                                                            
original disturbances. Then, for a variable to be a valid instrument, it has to be strongly exogenous, which
is a stronger assumption which is much less likely to be satisfied.
29 See Nickell, S. (1981).
30 See Arellano, M./Bond, S. (1991) and Doornik, J.A./Arellano, M./Bond, S. (1999).- 19 -
average, zero in  period . In the case of the capitalisation and the liquidity
variable, the overall mean (across time and banks) is substracted (equations (4) and
(5)). This creates bank characteristics that are zero across all observations, but not
necessarily at every single period . This allows the overall degree of liquidity and
capitalisation to vary across .
5 /
The monthly balance-sheet data available for this analysis spans the period 1992-
1998
31 and comprises all German banks (around 4400).
32 As quarterly macrodata and
information from the quarterly borrowers statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank have
also been used (for calculating the income and risk indices, for example), quarterly
values were taken by using end-of-quarter values. Accordingly, there are 28
observations for a bank that is in the database over the entire period under analysis, and
almost 100,000 observations are available.
5# 
!
Owing to the fact that the individual variables are based on balance-sheet data, a
specific endogeneity problem emerges: If bank loans and other balance-sheet positions
are strongly correlated, it is not clear a priori which position drives the other. The
following regressions cope with this problem in two ways: Firstly, based on the
Arellano & Bond (1991) procedure, all right-hand variables are instrumentalised by
their lagged levels (GMM-instruments). Secondly, the right-hand variables enter the re-
gression with at least one lag:
W Q W
N
N Q￿W N W Q
N
N W N W Q
N
N W Q N Q W Q
 	










, , log log
ε ∆ λ
∆ β ∆ ϕ α ∆
+ + ⋅ + ⋅ +











                                                     
31 There was a change in data definitions created by the harmonisation procedure in the run-up to EMU.
The data used in this study therefore ends in 1998 because the additionally available quarters from 1999 to
mid-2001 would be too few to appropriately handle this statistical break.
32 The analysis does not use information on bank-individual interest rates, because such information is
available only for a comparatively small number of banks (only about 10 % of all German banks).
Moreover, the information contained in this data is insufficient to analyse the question at hand, because it
only reports the medians of the distributions of the banks’ interest rates for given categories of loans and
deposits.- 20 -
The endogeneity/exogeneity-issue then hinges on a timing assumption: The driving
forces behind loan growth are correctly identified if loans are "Granger-caused" by
those factors.
As the maximum lag length * of the variables that enter the regression, four lags
proved to be sufficient. In order not to have different values for the bank characteristic
variable 	Q￿W at a given quarter  in the estimation equation, only one lag of 	
instead of four enters the regression at  (see equation (1a)) Therefore, at a given
quarter , the four interaction terms consist of 	Q￿W￿￿ and the respective lags of ∆ W:
(	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿), (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿), (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿) and (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿). Accordingly,
only 	Q￿W￿￿ is additionally included in a non-interacted fashion.
5# 0
A potential problem is posed by the large number of bank mergers that took place
during the observation period. Table 4 shows that this phenomenon was a major factor





total no of banks taken over liquidated
savings banks 735 (17 %) 150  (14 %) 0 (0 %)
credit cooperatives 3,151 (72 %) 39: '41) 4( 4  % )
“other banks” 505 (12 %) 54 (5 %) 107 (96 %)
Total 4,391 (100 %)  9 '991) 111 (100 %)
Within the systematic of the banking statistics of the Bundesbank, a merger of two
banks generally leads – among other things – to two changes: (a) one bank drops out of
the sample and (b) the second bank remains in the sample and the balance sheet
positions of the excluded bank are added to this bank. Hence, the balance sheet
positions of the remaining bank “jump” to the new level in the month after the merger.







be adequate with regard to the data if the variables are defined as ratios (e.g.






summing the balance-sheet items of the merging parties also for the time before
the merger.
(3) The merging banks are eliminated from the sample following the bank merger
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(b)  Is the receiving bank´s individual effect







(a) Have the individual
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Each of these three methods entails an implicit assumption with regard to the
unobservable characteristic of the individual banks (such as the quality of the
management, the bank strategy, etc.) which in the panel estimation is reflected by the
"bank-individual effect" α Q (see equation (1a)). For example, procedure 2 restricts the
individual effects of the merging banks to the same value over the entire observation
period. In terms of the unobservable individual characteristics, they are thus assumed
to be identical. This contrasts with procedure 3 where each of the merging banks is
allowed to have its own individual effect, i.e. its own (unobservable) characteristic.
Another implication of procedure 3 is that the new bank is given its own individual
effect, which may be different from the individual effects of one of the preceding
banks (as is the case in procedure 1) or from the average of the preceding banks (as is
the case in procedure 2).
These considerations indicate that procedures 1 to 3 can be categorised in terms of the
answers to two questions on the bank-individual effects α Q:
                                                     
33 The fourth box of the table is characterised by the following combination: the individual effects of the
merging banks are identical before the merger and the individual effect of the newly created bank is
different from these. This combination could imply that two identical banks merge in order to reach a size
that allows them to change their (unobservable) characteristics afterwards. This motive does not seem to
be very realistic, at least not in the German case. It will therefore not be considered below.- 22 -
(a) Have the individual effects of the merging banks been identical before the merger?
(b) Is the receiving bank’s individual effect allowed to change after the merger?
The resulting categorisation shows that procedures 2 and 3 are diametrically opposed
to each other in terms of their assumption structure (see table 5). This is interesting,
because the structure of assumptions listed in table 5 may follow from the specific
motives for the observed bank mergers: It is compatible with procedure 2 if the
mergers were mainly carried out to achieve economies of scale, since approximately
identical banks (i.e. banks with the same individual effect α Q) merge to reduce the
average costs per unit of output, i.e. they merge in order to increase their size. By
contrast, procedure 3 is the adequate treatment of mergers if the main motive for the
merger was to achieve economies of scope, since different banks (i.e. banks with
different individual effects) merge in order to broaden their spectrum of activities in
order to realise advantages of combining these different characteristics.
Which of these two motives was likely to be more responsible for the bank mergers
that took place in Germany is not evident 	
34Nevertheless, despite the fact that
much attention was given to a number of mergers which, according to official
pronouncements, were intended to combine different areas of operation – especially
mergers of large banks – most mergers, namely those between small and comparatively
homogeneous credit cooperatives were probably carried out for reasons of economies
of scale. This is also in line with the view of the Banking Supervision Committee
(BSC) which comes to the conclusion that economies of scale are the main rationale
for mergers among smaller banks (to which many of the savings banks and almost all
cooperative banks belong), whereas the comparatively few large-bank M&As often
reflect a repositioning of the institutions involved.
35 Therefore, the following
estimations will be based on data to which procedure 2 has been applied. In order to
check the robustness of the main results with respect to the merger procedure, the main
regressions will be repeated on the basis of procedures 1 and 3 (see section VII.2).
Applying procedure 2 to the data leads to a loss of about 10,000 observations, so that
3,296 banks and about 90,000 observations remain in the dataset. After removing those
banks that do not have observations in all necessary balance-sheet positions, 3,207
banks remain in the sample.
                                                     
34 For an analysis of the reasons for mergers among German cooperative banks, see Lang, G./Welzel, P.
(1999) and also European Central Bank (2000).
35 For the report of the the BSC, see European Central Bank (2000), especially p. 21.- 23 -
5#2 >	
A realisation of a variable is defined as an outlier if it is smaller or larger than
prespecified percentiles of the distribution of this variable across all banks and periods.
Given that outliers can very strongly bias the results in panel regressions, the danger of
eliminating "too few" observations should be weighted much higher than the danger of
eliminating "too many" observations, especially when taking into account the large
dataset. Therefore, when in doubt, the thresholds are chosen so that all possible
"dubious" observations are removed.
The choice of the critical values is made by visual inspection: In the case of ∆ log! the
2
nd and the 98
th percentile prove to be adequate; in the case of all 	 variables the 1
st
and the 99
th percentile are sufficient. In the case of bank size, the outlier procedure is
based on ∆ ( (rather than on () in order not to remove the large banks. In the cases of
capitalisation and liquidity it is directly based on 	 and ' respectively. Every bank
that has at least one outlier in either ∆ log! or the respective 	-variable is eliminated
from the sample. The number of observations and banks varies across regressions due
to the fact that the outlier procedure is regression-specific in the sense that it has only
been applied to ∆ log!and the respective 	variable(s): if, for example, we test for
size effects, those banks that have outliers in the liquidity or in the capitalisation
variable, but not in size, remain in the sample. This creates samples that are adequate









The end result is a reduction of the sample by around 13,000 observations (around 450
banks) so that about 2,800 banks and 75,000 observations remain in the sample.
5#7 0!		
There are several indications of the existence of strong bank-specific individual
seasonal patterns: First, regressions based on annual growth rates prove to be better in
terms of instrumentalisation and robustness than regressions based on first differences;
Second, this is also true when regressions are based on annualised data. Third,
estimating equation (1a) including seasonal dummies for every single bank
individually, results in a broad variety of different seasonal patterns.
If these bank-individual seasonal patterns are not properly accounted for, they tend to
worsen the quality of possible instruments and lead to a low degree of robustness of the
results with respect to changes in the specification. More importantly, different- 24 -
seasonal patterns create differences in the loan movements across banks that may
falsely be attributed to a differential reaction to monetary policy if not explicitly taken
into account. Therefore, in order to cope with this problem, all bank-specific variables
that enter the regressions are seasonally adjusted on an individual basis by applying the
following simple MA procedure:
(a)  for every quarter ', quarterly indices sQ￿T are computed as the centered moving
average of the respective variable  Q￿W (&Q￿Tis the number of observations of bank 

in quarter ', ' = 1...4):
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(b)  these quarterly indices are adjusted so that they multiply to one:
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(c)  the original values of variable  Q￿W are divided by Q￿T to obtain the seasonally
adjusted series.
This procedure has been applied bank-individually to ∆ log!Q￿W, Q￿W Q￿W and all 	Q￿W
variables.The resulting seasonal-adjusted values are used in the subsequent regressions.
5 		
5# 	, 	&					
In the basic specification, the three-month interest rate is used as the indicator of
monetary policy. Table 6a presents the results for each of the three bank
characteristics: In regression 1 size ((), in regression 2 liquidity ' and in
regression 3 capitalisation 	 are used The long-run coefficients of the respective
interaction term, of the income variable and of the risk variable are reported (all short-
run coefficients are reported in appendix 2).
The statistical tests indicate an adequate instrumentalisation in all cases.
36,37 Moreover,
in no case do the long-run coefficients of the control variables show a significantly
                                                     
36 Ideally, the instruments should be highly correlated with the variables for which they serve as
instruments, while they should be uncorrelated with the disturbances. This can be assessed on the basis of
autocorrelation (AR) tests and the Sargan Test. In order to find the adequate lag length for the instrumental- 25 -





Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A1 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
38
The long-run coefficient of the size-interaction is negative and insignificant (regression
1). This indicates that a bank’s reaction to monetary policy does not directly depend on
its size – which is contrary to what the 	

 theory would predict and also
contrasts with the results of the existing empirical literature on the US and on many
                                                                                                                                            
variables, every regression has been carried out several times, starting with lags 2 to 4 of the levels of the
regression variables. Typically, a poorer instrumentalisation (for example, only lag 2 or lags 2 and 3) led
to an insignificant sum of coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables, which implies very large
standard errors of the long-run coefficients of the other right-hand variables. In most cases, the AR tests
and the Sargan test pointed to an adequate instrumentalisation for a maximum lag of 6.
37 In almost all of the following regressions, the p-value of the Sargan test is one or close to one. This is
probably due to the comparatively large set of instrument variables used in the GMM estimations.
Reducing the number of instruments generally produces unsatisfactory results, such as a negative sum of
the coefficients of the lagged endogenous variable or insignificance (or wrong signs) of the coefficients of
the control variables. Obviously, the dynamic structure of the model is relatively complex (which is –
among other things – due to the quarterly frequency of the data) and can therefore only be adequately
captured by a very rich set of instruments. Further regressions show that this problem is exacerbated by the
inclusion of a set of time dummies. Nevertheless, the AR tests do not indicate a misspecification.
38 Inferences on the coefficients should normally be based on the first step results of the GMM-estimation,
but, owing to computational problems (estimations were carried out with DPD for Ox), the second-step
results were used instead. This does not alter the results significantly because the differences between the
first and the second step estimates are negligible owing to the large number of banks in the sample.
-0.0448 * 0.0353 *** 0.1360 ***
(0.0251) (0.0056) (0.0406)
1.1928 *** 0.7556 0.9602 **
(0.4884) (0.4933) (0.4916)
-0.6914 *** -0.7331 *** -0.5662 ***
(0.1186) (0.1222) (0.1189)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.405 0.557 0.348
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other countries.
39 In the case of liquidity (regression 2), the long-run coefficient of the
interaction term is significantly positive. This indicates that the long-run effect of an
increase in the interest rate on bank lending is the smaller, the more liquid a bank is:
The decrease of the volume of loans in reaction to a one percentage-point increase in
 will on average be 0.035 percentage-points smaller if the liquidity ratio of a bank
increases by one unit. This finding implies that, in periods of a restrictive monetary
policy, a borrower from a less liquid bank, on average, tends to suffer from a sharper
decline in lending than does a customer of a more liquid bank. According to regression
3, a comparable result also holds in the case of capitalisation: the better capitalised a
bank, the less its lending declines in response to a restrictive monetary policy measure.
It is also interesting to take a look at the short-run coefficients (see table Al in appendix
2), because they can give an indication of the control of possible loan 	

In all regressions reported in table A1, the four coefficients of the income variable are
insignificant for lags 1 and 2, but significantly positive either for lag 3 or 4. This is
compatible with the "cash-flow effect" of loan 	
: Given a certain rigidity in
expenditures, a reduction in income (which could be exogenous or caused by the
interest rate and/or the exchange rate channel of monetary policy) causes loan 	

to increase in the first two quarters, at least in some cases. If some loan customers also
decrease their loan 	
and/or some banks decrease loan  in reaction to the
decreasing income, such a mixture of positive and negative effects could explain the
insignificance of the income coefficients in the early quarters. It is only after some time
that the cash-flow effect loses its strength because expenditures are adapted. As a
result, overall loan 	
 decreases and the "income-expectation effect" starts to
dominate the movements of the loan aggregate: a higher income may imply or cause
the expectation of rising income in the future, thereby increasing investment and loan
	
Owing to the decreasing importance of this short-run "perverse" 	

reaction coming from the cash-flow effect, the income coefficient does not become
significantly positive before lag 3 or 4.
Obviously, a similar argument does not apply to the risk variable: Here, the coefficient
signs do not change significantly from positive to negative when increasing the lag.
Therefore, the hypothesis that a growing default risk of the existing loan portfolio may

	 loan growth in the very short run owing to an increasing 	
 for loans
cannot be confirmed by these regressions.
                                                     
39 See table 2 and, for example, deBondt, G.J. (1999).- 27 -
The results therefore indicate that the impact of monetary policy on bank loans differs
only with respect to two of the bank characteristics that have been considered: liquidity
and capitalisation. Possible bank loan supply effects of monetary policy cannot be
identified (solely) by bank size as the discriminating variable.
5# !		
The result that size is not crucial for a bank’s reaction to monetary policy can be
explained by the structure of the German banking system, which differs considerably
from that of other countries, e.g. the US. As shown in table 3, the small banks mainly
consist of credit cooperatives and – to a lesser extent – savings banks. Besides these
comparatively small institutions, the savings banks sector as well as the cooperative
sector also contain large superordinate central institutions.
40
As pointed out in section III, these central institutions maintain close relationships with
the lower-level institutions of their own system and with the "other" banks, while
savings banks and credit cooperatives have relationships almost exclusively with the
central institutions of their own network. Given these close interbank links within the
two systems, it is possible that, if monetary policy is restrictive, funds are channelled
from the central institutions to their affiliated small institutions, thus counteracting
potential funding problems otherwise faced by these small banks. Indeed, in a VECM
framework, Ehrmann & Worms (2001) show that after a restrictive monetary policy
shock, funds flow from the central institutions to the smaller banks of their respective
systems.
41 These flows are mainly reductions of short-term deposits held by the small
banks with the large banks. This observation is compatible with the hypothesis that
small banks reduce their short-term interbank deposits in order to cushion the effect of
a restrictive monetary policy on their loans to non banks.
This feature explains two of the regression results presented in table 6a: Firstly, the
interbank flows from large to small banks can be the reason for bank size not being a
significant determinant of a bank's reaction to monetary policy, although it is not clear
if the monetary-policy-induced interbank flows described in Ehrmann & Worms
(2001) are sufficient to offset possible bank-size related effects completely. Secondly,
given that the liquidity variable used in regression 2 contains short-term interbank
deposits (see appendix 1 for the exact definition), it could well be that the significant
                                                     
40 The central institutions of both sectors belong to the 5 % largest banks (Deutsche Bundesbank (2001 c)).
41 See Ehrmann, M./Worms, A. (2001).- 28 -
relationship between the banks’ liquidity and their reaction to monetary policy is




Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A1 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
In order to test this hypothesis, the liquidity variable is split into two parts: The
percentage share of short-term interbank deposits in total assets,  and the
precentage share of the remaining "other liquid assets" – which mainly consist of
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Repeating the regressions with these two components as the bank characteristic
variables yields the results presented in table 6b. Again, the control variables show
                                                     
42  and  are deviations from the overall mean (as is the case for the liquidity variable).
0.0976 *** -0.0172 ***
(0.0116) (0.0064)
1.1292 ** 1.2491 **
(0.5072) (0.5547)
-0.9123 *** -0.8220 ***
(0.1301) (0.1423)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.262 0.677

















1 − ⋅ 	  ∆- 29 -
significantly the expected signs. While the long-run coefficient of the interaction term
is significantly positive in case of the interbank variable (regression 4), it is
significantly negative in the case of the "other liquid assets" (regression 5). Despite the
fact that the latter result is difficult to explain at first glance
43, it nevertheless strongly
indicates that the significantly positive coefficient of the liquidity-interaction term
presented in table 6a (regression 2) is mainly driven by the movements of short-term
interbank deposits. Obviously, on average, banks do not draw on the assets contained
in the liquidity variable, other than short-term interbank deposits, to cushion the effects
of a restrictive monetary policy measure on loans.
5#2 	,	!		
Given the strong evidence in favor of short-term interbank deposits the weak result
especially for bank size leads to the following question: Is there a size effect if we
control for the influence of ? In order to test for this, the estimation equation is
enhanced to include both interaction terms, size and short-term interbank deposits. In
contrast to equation (1a) this extended equation therefore does not only contain one
"single-interaction" term but two, 0(and0Moreover, the respective "double-
interaction term" 0(0 has to be included additionally to allow for possible second
order effects. Furthermore, (,  and (0 are also included:
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Table 7 presents the results of estimating this “double-interaction” equation (regression
dl). The coefficients of the control variables ∆  and ∆  are significant and show the
expected signs. The coefficient of the interaction is significantly positive as in all
previous regressions. This again shows the strength of this effect.
                                                     
43 Splitting into its components reveils that the negative coefficient is mainly driven by debt securities
which make up more than 80 % of the assets contained in . One factor behind the negative sign could be
that some of the debt securities on the balance sheet of a bank have already been pledged as collateral in
repo-operations with other banks and are therefore no longer available for a further procurement of funds.





Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A2 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
Interestingly, the size-interaction term is now significantly positive (instead of
insignificant in table 6a). Therefore, when controlling for the effect of short-term
interbank deposits on a bank’s reaction to monetary policy, a positive size dependence
of this reaction cannot be rejected: A bank reacts less restrictively to a restrictive
monetary policy measure, the higher are its short-term interbank deposits 	
 the
larger it is, which is consistent with the 	

 theory. However, given that
such a positive coefficient of the size-interaction term does not show up in the single-
interaction regression presented in table 6a, it may be interpreted as being dominated
by the influence exerted by  Hence, the regressions presented in table 6a obviously
suffer from a strong omitted variable bias.
Another interesting result is the insignificance of the coefficient of the double
interaction with  This means that the strength of the effect of short-term interbank
deposits on the reaction of a bank to monetary policy does not depend on its size and
vice versa. Stated differently: A certain combination of ( and  implies a specific
reaction of loans to changes in  i.e. a specific (overall) long-run reaction coefficient
to monetary policy. Given an increase in size, this long-run coefficient remains
variable [expected signs]: 	1/
	2/
0.1011 *** 0.1221 *** 0.0091
(0.0258) (0.0464) (0.0383)
0.0988 *** 0.0775 *** 0.1814 ***
(0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0059)
0.0088 * 0.0157 * -0.0026 ***
(0.0049) 0.0090 (0.0009)
0.9958 ** 0.7762 0.3738
(0.4218) (0.7109) (0.6291)
-0.7778 *** -0.3950 *** -0.3703 **
(0.1028) (0.1604) (0.1594)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.263 0.559 0.619
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constant if short-term interbank deposits decrease accordingly. The zero long-run
coefficient of the double interaction implies that this substitution relation between (
and  is constant, i.e. independent of (the level of) ( and 
Table 7 also contains the results of using  and 	 simultaneously (regression d2).
Here again, the interaction term with short-term interbank deposits is positive, which
adds to the impression that this effect is very strong. Additionally, the coefficient of the
	 interaction term is significantly positive (as in table 6a): Other things being equal.,
loans of well capitalised banks decline less strongly than loans of less capitalised banks
if interest rates are increased.
44
Another possible combination of two bank-characterising variables is  and '
which can be interpreted as a test for the dominance of the  over '/ Given the
results from the "’single-interaction" regressions, the "weaker" of the two should drop
out if it does not contain additional information. Table 7 shows that the coefficient of
the  ' interaction is indeed insignificant (regression d3). This indicates that 
dominates ' i.e. for the average bank ' does not contain relevant information that is
not already contained in  Only the double-interaction term with monetary policy is
signifianctly negative. This indicates that the effect of short-term interbank deposits on
a bank’s reaction to monetary policy decreases with an increasing degree of liquidity,
i.e. the more other liquid assets the bank has.
5 (
5# .	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		
Besides the supply-demand identification problem, the empirical analysis of the 
	

 like the empirical literature on monetary transmission in general – has a
further key problem of identification: that between endogenous and exogenous
monetary policy measures. This is due to the fact that a central bank does not act in
isolation from all other variables of interest but reacts to (some of) them. Such a more
or less complex "reaction function" causes a measurement problem with regard to the
effects of monetary policy. Based on the assumption that the effects of endogenous and
exogenous monetary policy measures are identical, this measurement problem can be
obviated by assessing the monetary policy effect on the basis of  
 central
                                                     
44 The estimation of the“triple-interaction” equation that simultaneously contains the respective variables
for size, short-term interbank deposits and capitalisiation was not feasible, because no adequate set of
instrumental variables could be found for applying the Arellano & Bond (1991) procedure.- 32 -
bank measures ("interest-rate shocks").
45 This, in turn entails a problem of
identification of its own, however: the separation of endogenous and exogenous
interest-rate changes.
The literature proposes several alternatives for solving this problem, some of which
can be found in the overview of the literature in table 2 (see column "identification
assumptions with regard to monetary policy"). One is based, for example, on the
assumption that the searched-for exogenous component of the interest rate is its

  part. If it is possible to determine the expected short-term interest rate on
the basis of financial market data, this information could be used to calculate the
exogenous component of the interest rate.
46 Possible variables which could serve as
indicators here are forward rates, because they can ultimately be regarded as a "bet" on
future interest rate trends. However, for the case at hand this strategy comes with a
major drawback: if, for example, there is a difference between the expected and the
realised interest rate due to the unexpected movement of a third variable, say, the
exchange rate  the problem of identification of exogenous monetary policy measures
remains if the relationships between  the policy instrument, and the other
(macro)variables of interest are not considered explicitly. This problem is all the more
severe, the lower the frequency of the data used. With the quarterly frequency of the
data at hand, possible "third variables" have three months time to change between the
statistical record of the forward rate and the realisation of the respective interest rate.
Owing to the fact that this is a rather long time span – given that interest rates (and
exchange rates) change much faster – the difference between the lagged forward rate
and the realisation of the respective interest rate in the next quarter is probably a bad
indicator of the unexpected component in the in the interest rate.
An alternative method is the "narrative approach", which tries to find a yardstick for
the exogenous interest-rate measures in statements made by central banks or their
representatives – as they appear, for example, in speeches, publications and reports.
47
As has been repeatedly discussed in the literature
48, however, this method entails
specific serious problems in addition to those attached to most other approaches:
                                                     
45 This does not imply an assumption that endogenous central bank measures do not have any impact. It
only means that the aforementioned measurement problem does not exist for exogenous central bank
measures.
46 See, for example, Bagliano, F.C./Favero, C.A. (1999) and Rudebusch, G.D. (1996).
47 For the US, see Boschen, J.F./Mills, L.O. (1991) and Romer, C.D./Romer, D.H. (1989). For Germany,
see Tsatsaronis, C. (1993), Maier, P. (2000, 1999) and Worms, A. (1998), particularly pp. 256.
48 See, for example, McCallum, B.T. (2001), Leeper, E.M. (1996), Uhlig, H. (2001) and Christiano, L.J.
(2001).- 33 -
Firstly, it is difficult to exactly express the degree of restriction of monetary policy
using such a discontinuous variable.
49 Secondly, the analysis has to rely on the
"narrative sources", such as interviews given by central bank representatives (central
bank reports, minutes of meetings, etc.) which are not necessarily homogeneous and
which need not correspond to the actual actions taken by the central bank, especially,
for example, if the central bank uses some kind of "information policy". Thirdly,
empirical studies on the quality of the narrative indicators show that many of their
movements are endogenous and that they therefore do not possess significant
information advantages over other methods or over the interest rate itself.
50
Another method is to simply 	 a specific reaction function of the central bank,
e.g. a Taylor rule or a MCI-based rule.
51 This strategy comes with the problem that this
reaction function has to be a sufficiently good description of the central bank’s policy
rule. An alternative that implies much fewer a priori restrictions is to 	 the
reaction function, for example, within a VAR-framework. Here, the "interest rate
shocks" are interpreted as the exogenous interest-rate component. They indicate the
deviation of the actual interest rate from the estimated central bank reaction.
52 Based
on the fact that the use of an estimated reaction function of the central bank is probably
the most prominent alternative used in the literature (besides using the interest rate as
such), and given the problems that are inherent in the other methods discussed above,
the estimations will be repeated below using VAR shocks as the monetary policy
indicator in order to check the robustness of the results obtained so far.
The respective VAR contains a world commodity price index, US real GDP, the US
short-term interest rate and a linear trend as exogenous variables. Endogenous
variables are German real GDP, consumer prices, the three-month interest rate and the
real effective exchange rate.
53 The VAR allows for a contemporaneous response of the
interest rate to the exchange rate and is therefore much more realistic than many of the
                                                     
49 For an overview and a graph, see Boschen, J.F./Mills, L.O.(1995).
50 See, for example, Leeper, E.M. (1997).
51 See Taylor, J.B. (1993) and Deutsche Bundesbank (1999).
52 See, for example, Sims, C. (1996), Uhlig, H. (1998) and Bernanke, B.S./Mihov, I. (1995). Bemanke,
B.S./Mihov, I. (1996) and Clarida, R./Gertler, M. (1997) refer especially to the Bundesbank’s policy.
53 The VAR was estimated by F. Smets and R. Wouters whom I would like to thank for supplying me with
their data and results.
 See Smets, F./Wouters, R. (1999) for more information on the regression. The
sample period is 1980 - 1998.- 34 -
VARs for Germany that may be found in the existing literature. Moreover, it is able to






Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
° Coefficients of the interaction terms in case of VAR-shock (regression d4) multiplied by 100.
See table A3 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
The residuals of the short-term interest rate equation are interpreted as the exogenous
interest-rate component:  9$5
W
9$5
W W W      ) ( ˆ ˆ = − = .
55 Tables A4a and A4b (see
appendix 2) present the results from reestimating the single-interaction equation (1a)
                                                     
54 See, for example, Worms, A. (1998), especially pp. 278-291. In order to solve the identification
problem, the reaction coefficient on the exchange rate is estimated using the Japanese interest rate and US
dollar/yen exchange rate as instruments. See Smets, F./Wouters, R. (1999).
55 The VAR-shocks are available only up to the second quarter of 1998, so that the number of observations
used in the regressions presented in table 3 is smaller than the number of observations used in those
presented in table 4.
-0.0225 0.0966 *** 0.0774 0.1440 ***
(0.0000) (0.0370) (0.0504) (0.0315)
0.0196 *** 0.0866 *** 0.0767 *** 0.1087 ***
(0.0000) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0118)
0.0063 ** 0.0156 *** 0.0443 *** 0.0120 *
(0.0000) (0.0064) (0.0092) (0.0063)
0.5799 1.0237 * -0.6125 1.7932 **
(0.4327) (0.5653) (1.4528) (0.8328)
-0.8107 *** -0.3421 ** -0.3525 -0.3892 **







AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.622 0.793 0.771 0.327
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with this alternative monetary policy indicator. The tests indicate an adequate
instrumentalisation in all cases. The income variable is insignificant in the cases of size
and liquidity, but significantly positive in all other cases. The risk variable has a
significantly negative sign in all regressions. Moreover, in all cases (with the possible
exception of the ( regression), the size of the coefficients of the income and risk
variables is fairly similar to those presented in tables 6a and 6b.
A comparison of table A4b and tables 6a/6b shows that the signs of the coefficients of
the interaction-terms are robust with respect to a change of the -variable in the case
of ' and  This, and the fact that the coefficient of the -interaction in regression
10 is insignificant, further add to the impression that short-term interbank deposits play
the crucial role in determining the average bank’s reaction to monetary policy.
The coefficient of the interaction term with ( becomes significantly negative when
basing  on the VAR-shock, which is the opposite of what the 	

 theory
would predict: According to this result, large banks restrict their lending more strongly
in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy measure than small banks (in the case of
	 the coefficient of the interaction-term becomes insignificant).
Restimating the double-interaction regression dl of table 7 with the VAR shock as the
monetary policy indicator confirms the dominance of short-term interbank deposits
once again: the coefficient of the -interaction term is significantly positive
(regression d4 in table 8). But, contrasting regression dl, there is no significant
influence of size. Therefore, the significantly positive size effect found when
controlling for short-term interbank deposits (table 7) is not robust against this change
in the monetary policy indicator.
However, when interpreting these results, it should be borne in mind that the use of the
VAR-shock as the monetary policy indicator hinges on a number of important
assumptions.
56 One of the most critical is probably that the estimated exogenous (i.e.
unexpected) changes in the interest rate should have the same effects as the
endogenous (i.e. expected) changes. Only then can the estimated effect be used to
describe the overall effects of monetary policy. Given this problem and given that the
interest-rate shocks may change with a change in the VAR-specification, the lack of
robustness with respect to the monetary policy indicator may not be of great concern.
                                                     
56 For criticism of VAR approaches to measure monetary policy effects see, for example, McCallum, B.T.
(2001), Faust, J. (1998) and Rudebusch, G.D. (1996).- 36 -
In order to determine the "adequate" method of measuring monetary policy, these
drawbacks have to be weighted against the endogeneity/exogenity-problem that comes
with using the short-term interest rate as such. Given that the regressions are based on
bank-individual information (which probably does not lead the central bank to change
the interest rate) and that  does not enter the regressions contemporaneously, this
endogeneity/exogeneity-issue is probably less severe. Hence, in the following all
further results are presented using the preferred measure of monetary policy, the three-
month interest rate.
5# .	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
In section V.2 several alternative methods for the treatment of bank mergers were
presented and discussed. Based on the argument that the most probable motive for the
majority of mergers has been the attempt to realize economies of scale, procedure 2 has
been chosen for the basic regressions. However, given that alternative motives with
different implications for the bank individual effect could have been relevant as well,
the robustness of the main results of regression d1 in table 7 is tested by applying
procedures 1 and, alternatively, procedure 3 to the data.
Tables A5a/A5b (appendix 2) present the results of the single-interaction estimations
when mergers are completely ignored (procedure 1). These estimations lead to results
which are not very different from the estimations based on procedure 2 (tables 6a/6b):
The results with respect to the income variable do not differ qualitatively (they do not
even differ much with respect to the size of the coefficients). The same is true for the
risk variable. In case of ', the coefficient of the income variable becomes significant,
while it is insignificant in table 6a. As far as the interaction terms are concerned, the
qualitative results from applying procedure 2 can be confirmed in all cases.
57
Tables A6a/A6b (appendix 2) show the results from the single-interaction regression
when a meger creates a completely new bank (procedure 3). Again, the qualitative
results with respect to the interaction terms are not very different from those presented
in tables 6a/6b: Only in the case of 	 does the coefficient become insignificant. Also,
the results with respect to the risk-variable are robust. Somewhat problematic is the
                                                     
57 The number of banks in case of procedure (3) is comparatively small. This is due to the fact that, by
assuming that a merger leads to a new bank, many banks are in the sample for only a short period of time
(because they disappear after a merger or they are created by a merger), meaning that they do not have
enough successive observations to enter the regression.- 37 -
fact that the long-run coefficient of the income variable becomes insignificant or even
significantly negative in all cases. This can hardly be interpreted theoretically.
Table 8 presents the results of reestimating the double intercation equation d1
presented in table 7 for the two alternative treatments of merger (regressions d5 and
d6). First of all, the coefficient of the -interaction term is significantly positive in
both cases, indicating the robustness of this effect and the need to explicitly control for
it. While a size effect cannot be found when assuming that a merger creates a new bank
(regression d6), it is significantly positive if mergers are simply ignored (d5).
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether a bank’s size determines its loan
reaction to monetary policy depends on how mergers are treated: If mergers are
ignored or if we assume that the merger already took place in the initial period, a size
effect cannot be rejected as soon as we control for short-term interbank deposits. If
mergers lead to a completely new bank, such a size effect cannot be found.
Below, we assume in accordance with the larger part of the literature, that the lion´s
share of mergers took place in order to achieve economies of scale. Based on this
assumption, procedure 2 is the adequate method – and a significant size effect in the
double-interaction regression results.
5#2 			$	
Owing to the inclusion of a complete set of time dummies W, the preceding estimations
were carried out without  as an autonomous variable (see equations (1a) and (1b)).
However, in order to test whether the results are robust against a separate inclusion of
 the estimation is repeated without the set of time dummies, W. In this instance,
however, it is extended not just by  itself, but also by the logarithm of aggregate real
GDP 
DJJU and the logarithm of the aggregate price level 
DJJU (both in first differences).
While in the regressions with time dummies four lags of the right-hand variables
suffice to capture the dynamics, in the regressions with time series five lags are needed.
In the single-interaction case, therefore, the estimation equation looks as follows:
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. (1c)- 38 -
In order to capture at least some "standard time effects", a linear trend Wand quarterly
seasonal dummies 'W are also included in the regression equation (they enter (1c) in a
cumulated fashion in order to obtain a linear trend and seasonal dummies after
differencing once).
The inclusion of  in a non-interacted fashion also yields information on the
significance of the overall effect of monetary policy on the loans of the average bank.
Although it seems natural to expect a negative sign of the long-run coefficient of 
especially if the evidence based on VARs and theoretical considerations are taken into
account – this is not necessarily the case in panel regressions. The reason for this is that
large (i.e. macroeconomically very important) and small (i.e. macroeconomically less
important) banks enter the panel regression with the same weight: While the
macroeconomic evidence may be driven by the small number of large banks, the panel
evidence may be driven by the large number of small banks. Therefore, the long-run
coefficient of  in the panel regressions is not necessarily informative about the
overall macroeconomic effect of monetary policy on aggregate bank loans.
However, as table A7b (see appendix 2) shows, the long-run coefficients of  in the
single-interaction regressions are significantly negative in all cases. A higher rate of
inflation ∆ 
DJJUincreases the growth rate of loans in all cases. Aggregate real output
growth ∆ 
DJJU is insignificant in all regressions – the reason could be that this variable
contains no additional information compared with the bank-individual income variable
∆  which is significantly positive in all cases but the ' equation (which was also
insignificant when time dummies were used, see table 6a). As in all previous
regressions, the coefficient of the bank specific risk variable ∆  is very robust and
significantly negative in all cases.
Moreover, with respect to the coefficients of the interaction terms these results do not
differ qualitatively from those obtained in the basic regressions presented in tables
6a/6b, except in one case: The '-interaction term is significantly negative, whereas it
is significantly positive when a set of time dummies is used. This negative coefficient
is difficult to interpret theoretically. In the case of size there is no significant
coefficient, while it is significantly positive in the cases of capitalisation and short-term
interbank deposits, and significantly negative in the case of the other liquid assets. The
relative similarity in the results between using a set of time dummies and this set of
time series indicates that the chosen set of time series (together with the linear trend- 39 -
and the seasonal dummies) is able to capture the time effect on loan growth more or
less adequately.
Table 8 shows the results when reestimating the double-interaction regression d1 from
table 7. All control variables are significant and show the expected signs, with the
exception of the aggregate income variable which is insignificant. As when using time
dummies, there is a significantly positive coefficient of both the interaction term
and the (-interaction term, confirming the basic results obtained so far.
5#7 (		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Table 9 presents information on four groups of banks. They have been formed by first
ranking the banks according to their individual loan-market share and subsequently
sorting them into four groups that each hold (around) 25 % of the loan market (see also
table 3). The group of the largest banks that together holds around 25 % of the loan




(based on the sample used for estimating regression 4, i.e. corrected for outliers in ∆ log! and )
group: 	 	 	 	
number of banks 4 22 195 2188
RI￿ZKLFK￿ VDYLQJV￿EDQNV ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
FUHGLW￿FRRSHUDWLYHV ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RWKHU￿EDQNV ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
loan market share in % 26.3 24.1 24.6 25.0
average of  in % 14.9 10.9 7.6 10.0
average of ' in % 30.1 25.4 31.4 33.5
average of 	 in % 5.5 3.2 4.0 4.4
average of ( (log of total assets) 19.4 17.6 15.2 12.4
Given that all banks entered the previous regressions with the same weight, i.e.
irrespective of their size, it could well be that the results are driven solely by the many
very small banks in the sample. In order to test whether the results obtained so far hold
even if the least important banks in terms of the loan-market share are excluded, the
regressions presented in tables 6a and 6b are repeated with only those larger banks that
together constitute 75 % of the loan market, i.e. the "very small" banks are excluded
and the estimations are carried out anew with the remaining “larger banks”, which





Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%,1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A8 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
Table 10 presents the results: As in all preceding regressions the long-run coefficients
of the risk variable are significantly negative in all cases. Those of the income variable
are significantly positive in all cases, except in the regression with the  interaction.
Interestingly, all the coefficients of the interaction terms are now significantly positive:
This shows that the results for liquidity, capitalisation and short-term interbank
deposits presented in tables 6a and 6b hold qualitatively even if the sample is reduced
to contain only the larger banks.
Moreover, even those coefficients of interaction terms that were either insignificant
(size) or had an implausible sign ("other liquid assets") when using the whole sample,
now show significantly the expected signs.
58 This is especially interesting in the case of
the size interaction (regression 26): If the very small banks are excluded from the
sample, a significant size effect cannot be rejected even in the single-interaction
regression.
Obviously, the insignificance of the coefficient of the size-interaction in table 6a has
been caused by the very small banks – indicating that they do not behave in the way
predicted by the 	

theory. As has already been pointed out in section VI.2,
the reason for this is that these banks are mainly credit cooperatives and savings banks
                                                     
58 The qualitative results presented in table 6 are robust against using the VAR-shock in all cases except
for "other liquid assets".
0.1257 ** 0.0455 *** 0.3242 *** 0.0351 *** 0.0372 ***
(0.0524) (0.0054) (0.0263) (0.0124) (0.0064)
5.1608 *** 5.4195 *** 5.9016 *** 2.4208 3.0885 *
(1.3142) (1.7871) (1.8431) (2.6355) (1.6653)
-0.3521 *** -0.3679 *** -0.3483 *** -0.5487 *** -0.2441 ***
(0.0485) (0.0580) (0.0697) (0.1505) (0.0729)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.307 0.444 0.349 0.651 0.523
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1 − ⋅ 	  ∆- 41 -
(see tables 3 and 9) which use their short-term interbank deposits to cushion the effects
of monetary policy on their loan portfolio. This is consistent with the fact that these
banks hold relatively large buffers of short-term interbank deposits (see table 9): While
the share of short-term interbank assets in total assets amounts to an average of 10 %
for the very small banks, it amounts to only 8 % for all other banks. The motive for this
higher share could well be that the very small banks want to put themselves in a
position to cushion possible shocks which would otherwise force them to adapt their
loan portfolio more strongly. This would also be also consistent with the hypothesis
that these banks maintain close housebank relationships with their loan customers (see
above, section III). The large share of short-term interbank deposits in the total assets
of the group of the "very large" and "large" banks is probably not due to this motive,






Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%, 5%,1% level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A9 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
The long-run coefficient of the interaction with the “other liquid assets” is now
significantly positive (regression 30). This is compatible with the idea that – while the
                                                     













AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.573 0.602
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very small banks do not directly use their “other liquid assets” to cushion monetary
policy effects on their loans to private non-banks – the larger banks seem to do so.
Given that the “other liquid assets” mainly consist of securities, this is compatible with
the idea that (in contrast to the small banks) the large banks sell securities to partly
shield their loan portfolios from restrictive monetary policy measures.
However, this effect is comparatively small: While the influence of short-term
interbank deposits in the estimations based on the whole sample was strong enough to
completely dominate the size effect in the single-interaction regressions (see table 6a,
regression 1), the influence of the liquidity variable(s) is obviously too weak to
completely offset such a size effect in the case of the larger banks (see table 10,
regression 26).
Moreover, the size of the coefficients of the  and of the  interaction, as well as
that of the 'interaction are comparatively similar. This, together with the fact that
they all are significant, shows that splitting the liquidity variable into short-term
interbank deposits and “other liquid assets” may not be appropriate in the case of the
larger banks. Indeed, repeating the double-interaction regression with and ( (as in
tables 7 and 8) for the sample of large banks yields no significant long-run coefficient
for the  interaction with  and with (, but only a significant coefficient for the
double-interaction term (see table 11, regression d8). However, using liquidity '
instead of short-term interbank deposits basically confirms the results presented in
table 7 (regression d9): The long-run coefficient of the liquidity interaction is
significantly positive, and there is also a positive dependence of the banks´ reaction to
monetary policy on size (the significantly positive coefficients of the interaction terms




A crucial condition for the existence of a 	

 that works through bank loans
is that monetary policy should be able to change the of bank loans. This paper
contributes to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence from
dynamic-panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balance-sheet
                                                     
60 The results of the double-interaction regressions based on the reduced sample have to be interpreted
more cautiously than those based on the complete sample: Relative to the number of coefficients to be
estimated, the sample consists of comparatively few banks. Moreover, the long-run coefficients of the
control variables are insignificant in most cases.- 43 -
information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank´s response to
monetary policy mainly depends on its share of short-term interbank deposits in total
assets (and therefore also on its liquidity): The higher this share, the less strongly does
the average bank reduce its loans in reaction to an interest-rate increase. This is
compatible with the hypothesis that small banks – which are almost exclusively
organised in either the cooperative or the savings banks´ sector – draw on their short-
term interbank deposits to (at least partly) shield their loans to private non-banks from
restrictive monetary policy measures. This is also consistent with the existence of
“housebank-relationships” between those banks and their loan customers.
A significant dependence of a bank´s reaction to monetary policy on its size can only
be found if, at the same time, there is an appropriate control for the strong influence
exerted by short-term interbank deposits. Otherwise, an omitted variable bias results.
Reducing the sample to those largest banks that together cover 75 % of the loan market
(only about 10 % of all banks) – which excludes most of the (small) savings banks and
credit cooperatives – reveals that the lack of a size effect in the basic regressions was
mainly due to the behavior of the small banks which hold a comparatively large share
of short-term interbank deposits on which they can draw. Moreover, for the larger
banks it is not only short-term interbank deposits but rather also their overall liquidity
which seems to determine their reaction to monetary policy.
These results are based on the three-month interest rate as the monetary policy
indicator. Given the discussion in the literature of how to adequately measure monetary
policy in an empirical anlysis, the regressions have also been carried out on the basis of
a VAR-shock. In this robustness check, neither a positive dependence on size nor on
capitalisation could be found for the complete sample, irrespective of whether there
was control for short-term interbank deposits or not. Only the dependence on short-
term interbank deposits is robust against this change in the policy indicator. Besides
the check for robustness with respect to the monetary policy indicator, further
robustness checks have been carried out (with respect to the treatment of mergers and
the inclusion of time series).
Overall, there is very robust evidence in favor of a differential reaction to monetary
policy across all banks that depends on short-term interbank deposits: Owing to the
fact that (smaller) banks draw on their short-term interbank deposits in reaction to a
restrictive monetary policy measure, small banks do not reduce loans more sharply
than large ones. Moreover, as soon as we control for the effect of short term interbank- 44 -
deposits (or of liquidity) and/or we exclude the very small banks from the sample,
there is evidence of a differential reaction to monetary policy across banks that
depends on size: large banks react less strongly than small banks.
The key assumption that must hold in order to interpret these results as evidence of the
existence of a 	

 is that these effects have to be attributable to a differential
reaction of the banks´ loan  to monetary policy. Put differently, the stated
differences in the loan response across banks should not be due to differences in loan
demand or to differences in loan supply that are not caused by monetary policy. Given
the results of this paper, this basically amounts to assuming that in reaction to a
monetary-policy-induced interest rate increase, the loan 	
 faced by small (and
less liquid) banks should not decline more sharply than the loan	
 faced by large
(and more liquid) banks.
Interpreted in this way, the results in this paper are compatible with the existence of a
	

in Germany. This is a comparatively strong outcome if we take into
account the fact that – by using the bank-individual income and risk variables, and by
explicitly considering bank-individual seasonal patterns – the regressions allow for
many more differences in the movements of loans across banks which are not
attributable to monetary-policy-induced supply changes than was the case in most of
the previous literature.- 45 -
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 = bank  index
 = period  (quarter)  index
# = sector  index
W = short-term market rate (three-month interest rate) .
%Q￿W = sum of total assets of bank 
.
!Q￿W = volume of loans of bank 
 to domestic firms, private persons and non-
profit organisations
Q￿W = bank-specific risk-variable: weighted average of the number of
insolvencies
Q￿W = bank-specific income-variable: weighted average of the real output
M




 ! , = volume of loans of bank 
 to sector # (or to private households).
#
 
 = number of insolvent firms from sector# (private households are
generally assumed to be solvent).
(Q￿W = log of total assets of bank 

	Q￿W = capital of bank 
 as a percentage of total assets of bank 

'Q￿W = liquid assets of bank 




+  balances with the central bank
+ treasury bills, treasury certificates and similar debt instruments
issued by public bodies (eligible for refinancing)
+ debt securities
+ shares and other variable-yield securities
+ asset items constituting claims on credit institutions with an
agreed maturity or redeemable at notice of one year or less.
Q￿W = short-term interbank deposits of bank 
 as a percentage of total assets of
bank 
: short-term interbank deposits are:
asset items constituting claims on credit institutions with an
agreed maturity or redeemable at notice of one year or less
Q￿W = “other liquid assets” of bank 
 as a percentage of total assets of bank 
;
“other liquid assets” consist of:
cash
+  balances with the central bank
+ treasury bills, treasury certificates and similar debt instruments
issued by public bodies (eligible for refinancing)
+ debt securities
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.0599 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0737 *** 0.0198 *** -0.0056 **
(0.0087) (0.0019) (0.0154) (0.0038) (0.0024)
-0.0072 0.0082 *** 0.0224 * 0.0281 *** -0.0027
(0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0118) (0.0036) (0.0019)
-0.0381 *** 0.0033 * 0.0434 ** 0.0245 *** -0.0100 ***
(0.0101) (0.0019) (0.0174) (0.0040) (0.0025)
0.0684 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0263 0.0066 0.0041 *
(0.0111) (0.0020) (0.0185) (0.0041) (0.0024)
0.1254 *** 0.1199 *** 0.1176 *** 0.1265 *** 0.1252 ***
(0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0062)
0.1112 *** 0.1175 *** 0.1115 *** 0.1189 *** 0.1106 ***
(0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0056)
0.0633 *** 0.0663 *** 0.0624 *** 0.0669 *** 0.0586 ***
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0049)
-0.1216 *** -0.1186 *** -0.1237 *** -0.1220 *** -0.1276 ***
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0044)
0.2346 0.0755 0.1547 0.2503 0.1806
(0.1634) (0.1690) (0.1683) (0.1743) (0.1809)
0.1090 0.0191 -0.0223 -0.0171 0.1658
(0.1625) (0.1649) (0.1683) (0.1713) (0.1779)
0.3626 ** 0.2497 0.2949 * 0.3254 ** 0.3391 **
(0.1560) (0.1525) (0.1540) (0.1535) (0.1688)
0.2739 * 0.2714 * 0.3717 ** 0.3557 ** 0.3554 **
(0.1536) (0.1520) (0.1533) (0.1573) (0.1684)
-0.2799 *** -0.2685 *** -0.2563 *** -0.3618 *** -0.3087 ***
(0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0445) (0.0415)
-0.1639 *** -0.1781 *** -0.1366 *** -0.1657 *** -0.1751 ***
(0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0327) (0.0352) (0.0362)
-0.0265 -0.0497 * -0.0026 -0.0890 *** -0.0594 *
(0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0304) (0.0344)
-0.0977 *** -0.1010 *** -0.0755 *** -0.1221 *** -0.1417 ***
(0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0250) (0.0281)
0.0069 0.0005 *** 0.0026 0.0003 *** -0.0001
(0.0084) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0005 -0.0008 * -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.405 0.557 0.348 0.262 0.677

































57615 58276 58374 52565
2625 2654 2659 2397 2611
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.0320 *** 0.0473 *** 0.0016
(0.0089) (0.0169) (0.0021)
0.0335 *** -0.0003 0.0028 *
(0.0062) (0.0152) (0.0017)
-0.0115 0.0623 *** -0.0033 *
(0.0098) (0.0191) (0.0022)
0.0977 *** -0.0056 0.0065
(0.0104) (0.0193) (0.0022)
0.0204 *** 0.0170 *** 0.0483 ***
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0134)
0.0313 *** 0.0224 *** 0.0312 **
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0124)
0.0227 *** 0.0237 *** 0.0415 ***
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0154)
0.0113 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0305 **
(0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0152)




0.0046 *** -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0004)
0.0005 0.0143 *** -0.0008 **
(0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0004)
0.1024 *** 0.1206 *** 0.1174 ***
(0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0060)
0.0955 *** 0.1119 *** 0.1103 ***
(0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0056)
0.0584 *** 0.0535 *** 0.0616 ***
(0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0056)
-0.1239 *** -0.1346 *** -0.1251 ***
(0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0049)




0.3548 ** 0.2544 0.2140
(0.1406) (0.2082) (0.1988)
0.2565 * 0.3706 ** 0.3269 *
(0.1376) (0.1887) (0.1839)
-0.3403 *** -0.2686 *** -0.2403 ***
(0.0373) (0.0571) (0.0566)
-0.1357 *** -0.0745 * -0.0510
(0.0295) (0.0435) (0.0424)
-0.0792 *** 0.0287 0.0054
(0.0254) (0.0399) (0.0386)
-0.1197 *** -0.0207 -0.0236
(0.0218) (0.0326) (0.0320)
-0.0487 *** -0.0051 ** 0.0008 ***
(0.0084) (0.0023) (0.0003)
0.0005 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0004 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)




AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.263 0.559 0.619
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
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-0.0076 ** -0.0204 * -0.0432 ** -0.0063
(0.0030) (0.0113) (0.0200) (0.0117)
-0.0075 ** 0.0308 *** 0.0245 * 0.0189 *
(0.0036) (0.0077) (0.0130) (0.0101)
0.0027 -0.0192 -0.0197 -0.0164
(0.0041) (0.0124) (0.0197) (0.0110)
-0.0078 ** 0.0943 *** 0.1123 *** 0.0668 ***
(0.0037) (0.0128) (0.0201) (0.0114)
0.0659 ***
(0.0109)
0.0052 *** 0.0161 *** 0.0143 ** 0.0240 ***
(0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0060) (0.0039)
0.0048 *** 0.0279 *** 0.0170 *** 0.0298 ***
(0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0060) (0.0038)
0.0043 *** 0.0209 *** 0.0192 *** 0.0212 ***
(0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0040)
0.0033 ** 0.0118 *** 0.0227 *** 0.0078 *
(0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0041)
0.0147 ***
(0.0036)
0.0010 * 0.0057 *** 0.0092 *** 0.0043 **
(0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0021)
0.0020 *** 0.0019 0.0080 *** 0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0020)
0.0015 * 0.0030 0.0131 *** 0.0044 **
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0020)
0.0010 * 0.0032 * 0.0119 *** -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0021)
0.0019
(0.0018)
0.0866 *** 0.1042 *** 0.0804 *** 0.0973 ***
(0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0244) (0.0083)
0.0938 *** 0.1045 *** 0.0533 ** 0.0894 ***
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0226) (0.0061)
0.0565 *** 0.0475 *** -0.0120 0.0522 ***
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0237) (0.0048)
-0.1338 *** -0.1421 *** -0.0755 ** -0.1377 ***
(0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0355) (0.0044)
0.0023
(0.0050)
0.1454 0.2013 -0.7066 * 0.5569 **
(0.1601) (0.1896) (0.4270) (0.2291)
-0.2523 0.0478 -0.2884 0.0332
(0.1580) (0.1888) (0.4577) (0.1902)
0.2783 * 0.4691 ** -0.1391 0.4350 **
(0.1448) (0.1899) (0.3816) (0.1894)
0.3487 ** 0.1887 0.5499 ** 0.3425 *
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.3625 *** -0.3328 *** -0.0622 -0.3128 ***
(0.0383) (0.0554) (0.0978) (0.0476)
-0.1531 *** -0.0450 -0.0387 0.0184
(0.0307) (0.0393) (0.1007) (0.0456)
-0.1032 *** 0.0920 ** -0.0924 -0.0115
(0.0259) (0.0375) (0.0985) (0.0395)
-0.1084 *** -0.0173 -0.1430 -0.0835 **

































-0.0708 *** -0.0265 ** -0.0018 -0.0380 ***
(0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0256) (0.0109)
-0.0001 0.0006 *** 0.0001 0.0006 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
0.0002 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0002 ***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0006 -0.0012 ** 0.0001 0.0139 ***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0020)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.622 0.793 0.771 0.327
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.0180 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0115 ** 0.0044 *** 0.0000
(0.0032) (0.0006) (0.0057) (0.0012) (0.0007)
-0.0158 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0154 ** 0.0038 ** -0.0001
(0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0075) (0.0018) (0.0010)
-0.0111 *** 0.0021 ** 0.0086 0.0042 ** -0.0008
(0.0043) (0.0009) (0.0084) (0.0020) (0.0011)
-0.0140 *** -0.0003 0.0086 0.0048 *** -0.0031 ***
(0.0040) (0.0007) (0.0070) (0.0014) (0.0009)
0.1032 *** 0.1277 *** 0.1175 *** 0.1187 *** 0.1149 ***
(0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0055)
0.1036 *** 0.1244 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1207 *** 0.1138 ***
(0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0051)
0.0601 *** 0.0696 *** 0.0673 *** 0.0678 *** 0.0654 ***
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0045)
-0.1335 *** -0.1293 *** -0.1332 *** -0.1323 *** -0.1335 ***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0041)
0.0707 0.0739 0.1487 0.2362 0.2146
(0.1694) (0.1751) (0.1734) (0.1799) (0.1725)
0.0278 -0.0030 -0.0428 -0.0274 0.2040
(0.1666) (0.1712) (0.1730) (0.1777) (0.1691)
0.3215 ** 0.2261 0.3104 ** 0.2767 * 0.3813 **
(0.1568) (0.1565) (0.1559) (0.1569) (0.1549)
0.3401 ** 0.3309 ** 0.4479 *** 0.4269 *** 0.5019 ***
(0.1577) (0.1612) (0.1604) (0.1642) (0.1608)
-0.2691 *** -0.2834 *** -0.2713 *** -0.3816 *** -0.3165 ***
(0.0352) (0.0376) (0.0368) (0.0463) (0.0383)
-0.1605 *** -0.1922 *** -0.1565 *** -0.1788 *** -0.1953 ***
(0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0370) (0.0340)
-0.0455 -0.0867 *** -0.0272 -0.1056 *** -0.0849 ***
(0.0278) (0.0304) (0.0298) (0.0309) (0.0313)
-0.0865 *** -0.1085 *** -0.0699 *** -0.1167 *** -0.1275 ***
(0.0229) (0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0251)
-0.0361 *** 0.0000 0.0032 * -0.0004 *** 0.0003 ***
(0.0087) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0008 * -0.0006 -0.0008 * -0.0001 -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.845 0.970 0.843 0.639 0.968


































54994 55626 55719 50182
2625 2654 2659 2397
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.

	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-0.0681 *** 0.0088 *** 0.0530 * 0.0209 ** -0.0048
(0.0157) (0.0003) (0.0300) (0.0067) (0.0038)
0.8770 * 0.7776 1.0398 ** 1.1058 ** 1.5510 ***
(0.4770) (0.5111) (0.5011) (0.5105) (0.4962)
-0.6481 *** -0.8307 *** -0.6315 *** -0.9487 *** -0.8629 ***
(0.1122) (0.1316) (0.1235) (0.1338) (0.1300)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.845 0.970 0.843 0.639 0.968
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.0510 *** 0.0135 *** 0.0568 *** 0.0232 *** -0.0047 *
(0.0096) (0.0022) (0.0161) (0.0039) (0.0025)
-0.0058 0.0084 *** 0.0503 *** 0.0276 *** -0.0051 ***
(0.0052) (0.0016) (0.0126) (0.0038) (0.0020)
-0.0345 *** 0.0062 *** 0.0373 ** 0.0230 *** -0.0091 ***
(0.0108) (0.0022) (0.0177) (0.0042) (0.0026)
0.0807 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0013 0.0063 0.0039
(0.0126) (0.0022) (0.0192) (0.0043) (0.0025)
0.1139 *** 0.1089 *** 0.1027 *** 0.1142 *** 0.1147 ***
(0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0058)
0.1069 *** 0.1088 *** 0.1018 *** 0.1127 *** 0.1110 ***
(0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0050)
0.0534 *** 0.0528 *** 0.0522 *** 0.0533 *** 0.0549 ***
(0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0045)
-0.1155 *** -0.1161 *** -0.1179 *** -0.1179 *** -0.1193 ***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0042)
0.4187 ** 0.1881 0.1514 0.1891 0.2605
(0.1819) (0.1832) (0.1804) (0.1897) (0.1846)
0.1257 0.1072 -0.0457 -0.1591 0.2493
(0.1832) (0.1826) (0.1886) (0.1959) (0.1821)
0.5776 *** 0.4543 *** 0.3864 ** 0.5690 *** 0.4978 ***
(0.1763) (0.1741) (0.1791) (0.1823) (0.1770)
0.4966 *** 0.4371 ** 0.5894 *** 0.3720 ** 0.5348 ***
(0.1743) (0.1714) (0.1754) (0.1835) (0.1786)
-0.2051 *** -0.1824 *** -0.2128 *** -0.3669 *** -0.1661 ***
(0.0321) (0.0313) (0.0326) (0.0456) (0.0309)
-0.1305 *** -0.1371 *** -0.1294 *** -0.1145 *** -0.1222 ***
(0.0295) (0.0291) (0.0297) (0.0342) (0.0303)
0.0403 0.0208 0.0393 0.0392 0.0213
(0.0260) (0.0267) (0.0278) (0.0317) (0.0281)
-0.0659 *** -0.0522 ** -0.0641 *** -0.0571 ** -0.0847 ***
(0.0218) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0245) (0.0229)
0.0105 0.0007 *** 0.0037 ** 0.0003 *** 0.0000
(0.0079) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0014 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0012 ** -0.0013 **
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.791 0.454 0.597 0.592 0.296
Sargan (p-val, 2nd step) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
lags of IVs
no of observations
no of banks 2212 2262 2255 2264 2015
49610 49498 49665 44143 48559
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.
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-0.0126 0.0435 *** 0.1691 *** 0.0956 *** -0.0179 ***
(0.0283) (0.0059) (0.0418) (0.0118) (0.0065)
1.9238 *** 1.4033 *** 1.2559 ** 1.1591 ** 1.8393 ***
(0.5352) (0.5107) (0.5163) (0.5414) (0.5335)
-0.4293 *** -0.4150 *** -0.4260 *** -0.5961 *** -0.4196 ***
(0.1044) (0.1055) (0.1067) (0.1195) (0.1088)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.791 0.454 0.597 0.592 *** 0.296





2262 2255 2264 2015 2212
49610 49498 49665 44143
regression 11 regression 12 regression 13 regression 14
2-7
regression 15
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.0610 *** 0.0093 *** 0.0009 0.0177 *** -0.0076 **
(0.0145) (0.0027) (0.0207) (0.0048) (0.0033)
-0.0178 ** 0.0069 *** -0.0064 0.0238 *** -0.0059 **
(0.0083) (0.0021) (0.0172) (0.0046) (0.0027)
-0.0429 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0010 0.0277 *** -0.0078 **
(0.0143) (0.0026) (0.0220) (0.0047) (0.0033)
0.0620 *** 0.0096 *** 0.0140 0.0207 *** 0.0004
(0.0151) (0.0025) (0.0218) (0.0049) (0.0031)
0.1176 *** 0.1200 *** 0.1167 *** 0.1242 *** 0.1286 ***
(0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0078)
0.1095 *** 0.1202 *** 0.1117 *** 0.1137 *** 0.1208 ***
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0054) (0.0064) (0.0075)
0.0532 *** 0.0609 *** 0.0526 *** 0.0558 *** 0.0537 ***
(0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0074)
-0.1536 *** -0.1508 *** -0.1529 *** -0.1588 *** -0.1636 ***
(0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0065)
-0.3556 *** -0.1996 * -0.3465 *** -0.2795 *** -0.0142
(0.0938) (0.1041) (0.0955) (0.1034) (0.1278)
-0.1112 0.0111 -0.1380 -0.1542 0.1257
(0.0870) (0.0979) (0.0892) (0.0955) (0.1308)
-0.2949 *** -0.1577 * -0.3102 *** -0.0718 -0.0845
(0.0823) (0.0881) (0.0840) (0.0872) (0.1145)
-0.1624 * 0.0028 -0.2003 ** -0.0010 -0.0348
(0.0898) (0.1025) (0.0909) (0.0985) (0.1249)
-0.1409 *** -0.1565 *** -0.1419 *** -0.1764 *** -0.2199 ***
(0.0188) (0.0235) (0.0194) (0.0239) (0.0288)
-0.1183 *** -0.1169 *** -0.1033 *** -0.1294 *** -0.1496 ***
(0.0168) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0186) (0.0224)
-0.1666 *** -0.1672 *** -0.1592 *** -0.1665 *** -0.1439 ***
(0.0166) (0.0182) (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0235)
-0.1693 *** -0.1660 *** -0.1563 *** -0.1466 *** -0.1339 ***
(0.0120) (0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0178)
-0.0059 0.0008 *** 0.0012 0.0006 *** -0.0007 ***
(0.0097) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0002)
-0.0012 ** -0.0016 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0010 * -0.0009
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.792 0.894 *** 0.524 0.692 *** 0.849































32133 32252 32270 29161 31778
2-7 2-6 2-7
1810 1822 1821 1670 1787
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.

			#
-0.0684 * 0.0443 *** 0.0110 0.1039 *** -0.0243 ***
(0.0368) (0.0062) (0.0551) (0.0136) (0.0088)
-1.0581 *** -0.4041 -1.1412 *** -0.5855 * -0.0090
(0.3055) (0.3483) (0.3133) (0.3402) (0.4682)
-0.6815 *** -0.7139 *** -0.6431 *** -0.7154 *** -0.7522 ***
(0.0594) (0.0717) (0.0612) (0.0690) (0.0909)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.792 0.894 0.524 0.692 0.849








regression 16 regression 17 regression 18 regression 19 regression 20
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.
... continued on next page.
-0.0425 *** -0.0052 ** 0.0482 *** 0.0235 *** -0.0052 **
(0.0112) (0.0026) (0.0184) (0.0041) (0.0026)
-0.0274 *** -0.0039 * 0.0389 ** 0.0301 *** -0.0039 *
(0.0087) (0.0022) (0.0155) (0.0041) (0.0022)
-0.0409 *** -0.0119 *** 0.0465 *** 0.0252 *** -0.0119 ***
(0.0103) (0.0025) (0.0178) (0.0041) (0.0025)
0.0541 *** 0.0042 * -0.0227 0.0057 0.0042 *
(0.0112) (0.0025) (0.0188) (0.0044) (0.0025)
0.0589 *** -0.0032 -0.0374 ** 0.0109 *** -0.0032
(0.0107) (0.0023) (0.0180) (0.0037) (0.0023)
0.1263 *** 0.1260 *** 0.1158 *** 0.1285 *** 0.1260 ***
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0077)
0.1116 *** 0.1101 *** 0.1090 *** 0.1157 *** 0.1101 ***
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0061)
0.0649 *** 0.0589 *** 0.0618 *** 0.0653 *** 0.0589 ***
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0052)
-0.1285 *** -0.1371 *** -0.1317 *** -0.1282 *** -0.1371 ***
(0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0049)
0.0120 ** 0.0037 0.0087 * 0.0183 *** 0.0037
(0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0057)
0.5361 *** 0.4962 ** 0.4225 ** 0.5324 ** 0.4962 **
(0.2012) (0.2426) (0.2050) (0.2133) (0.2426)
0.2463 0.3230 0.1218 0.1910 0.3230
(0.1833) (0.2071) (0.1877) (0.1923) (0.2071)
0.4472 *** 0.5521 *** 0.4439 ** 0.4982 *** 0.5521 ***
(0.1733) (0.2057) (0.1741) (0.1727) (0.2057)
0.3464 * 0.3878 * 0.3732 ** 0.4189 ** 0.3878 *
(0.1780) (0.2061) (0.1774) (0.1827) (0.2061)
0.1085 0.2337 0.0771 0.2191 0.2337
(0.1811) (0.2145) (0.1794) (0.1852) (0.2145)
-0.3377 *** -0.3358 *** -0.2987 *** -0.3880 *** -0.3358 ***
(0.0395) (0.0463) (0.0395) (0.0481) (0.0463)
-0.1609 *** -0.1357 *** -0.1345 *** -0.0778 * -0.1357 ***
(0.0395) (0.0461) (0.0396) (0.0469) (0.0461)
-0.0770 ** -0.0619 -0.0374 -0.0806 ** -0.0619
(0.0339) (0.0420) (0.0339) (0.0387) (0.0420)
-0.1779 *** -0.1693 *** -0.1401 *** -0.1704 *** -0.1693 ***
(0.0321) (0.0386) (0.0309) (0.0374) (0.0386)
-0.0791 *** -0.0443 -0.0568 ** -0.0367 -0.0443
(0.0259) (0.0303) (0.0265) (0.0292) (0.0303)
-0.1971 *** -0.1109 * -0.1872 *** -0.0051 -0.1109 *
(0.0461) (0.0584) (0.0480) (0.0522) (0.0584)
0.0747 ** 0.0901 ** 0.0623 0.1256 *** 0.0901 **
(0.0377) (0.0408) (0.0405) (0.0428) (0.0408)
-0.1640 *** -0.2630 *** -0.2448 *** -0.2071 *** -0.2630 ***
(0.0428) (0.0519) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0519)
-0.4579 *** -0.3641 *** -0.3798 *** -0.3632 *** -0.3641 ***
(0.0612) (0.0713) (0.0622) (0.0611) (0.0713)
-1.1877 *** -1.0071 *** -1.1309 *** -0.9387 *** -1.0071 ***
(0.0773) (0.0930) (0.0805) (0.0821) (0.0930)
-0.4450 *** -0.3177 *** -0.3696 *** -0.3213 *** -0.3177 ***
(0.0625) (0.0769) (0.0636) (0.0625) (0.0769)
-0.1758 *** -0.0969 ** -0.1170 *** -0.0935 *** -0.0969 **
(0.0356) (0.0448) (0.0360) (0.0347) (0.0448)
-0.3919 *** -0.2612 *** -0.3168 *** -0.2775 *** -0.2612 ***
(0.0540) (0.0660) (0.0563) (0.0563) (0.0660)
0.2455 *** 0.2170 *** 0.2302 *** 0.1899 *** 0.2170 ***
(0.0227) (0.0284) (0.0230) (0.0219) (0.0284)
0.7291 *** 0.6362 *** 0.7011 *** 0.6217 *** 0.6362 ***
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance at 1% level, ** Significance at 5% level , * Significance at 10% level.
-1.5935 *** -1.3216 *** -1.5223 *** -1.3851 *** -1.3216 ***
(0.1412) (0.1678) (0.1473) (0.1523) (0.1678)
2.4557 *** 2.0708 *** 2.2915 *** 2.0027 *** 2.0708 ***
(0.2050) (0.2534) (0.2099) (0.2098) (0.2534)
1.2352 *** 1.0660 *** 1.1357 *** 1.0631 *** 1.0660 ***
(0.1100) (0.1360) (0.1116) (0.1104) (0.1360)
1.0520 *** 0.8871 *** 0.9494 *** 0.8349 *** 0.8871 ***
(0.1041) (0.1278) (0.1051) (0.1021) (0.1278)
2.8211 *** 2.2811 *** 2.5516 *** 2.2533 *** 2.2811 ***
(0.2696) (0.3342) (0.2739) (0.2726) (0.3342)
0.0093 -0.0003 * 0.0023 0.0005 *** -0.0003 *
(0.0089) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0002)
0.0151 *** 0.0126 *** 0.0134 *** 0.0101 *** 0.0126 ***
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0024)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.687 0.421 0.444 0.620 0.648





































0.0027 -0.0238 *** 0.0879 ** 0.1192 *** -0.0238 ***
(0.0303) (0.0071) (0.0473) (0.0138) (0.0078)
2.0699 *** 2.3771 1.7197 *** 2.3233 *** -0.0089 ***
(0.7942) (0.9755) (0.7641) (0.8176) (0.9719)
-1.0232 *** -0.8912 ** -0.7980 *** -0.9414 *** -0.8912 ***
(0.1691) (0.1718) (0.1584) (0.1939) (0.1909)
-2.3743 *** -1.9742 *** -2.2481 *** -1.7349 *** -1.9742 ***
(0.1858) (0.2266) (0.1805) (0.1930) (0.2053)
-0.0468 0.2115 0.1530 0.1491 0.2115
(0.1184) (0.1390) (0.1202) (0.1230) (0.1387)
7.3368 *** 5.9445 *** 6.4630 *** 5.9586 *** 5.9445 ***
(0.7134) (0.8472) (0.6839) (0.6926) (0.8251)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.687 0.421 0.444 0.620 0.648
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).




-0.1491 *** 0.0213 *** 0.1826 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0158 ***
(0.0156) (0.0015) (0.0089) (0.0037) (0.0021)
0.0686 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0509 *** 0.0227 *** 0.0089 ***
(0.0095) (0.0012) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0015)
0.1009 *** -0.0049 *** -0.1332 *** -0.0081 ** -0.0017
(0.0177) (0.0015) (0.0096) (0.0035) (0.0017)
0.0824 *** -0.0019 0.1623 *** -0.0037 0.0060 ***
(0.0171) (0.0011) (0.0110) (0.0036) (0.0020)
0.1246 *** 0.0933 *** 0.1062 *** 0.1120 *** 0.0888 ***
(0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0235) (0.0195)
0.1034 *** 0.1249 *** 0.1130 *** 0.1318 *** 0.1282 ***
(0.0152) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0193) (0.0165)
0.0768 *** 0.1208 *** 0.0717 *** 0.1145 *** 0.0863 ***
(0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0197) (0.0142)
-0.1215 *** -0.0583 *** -0.1014 *** -0.0628 *** -0.0843 ***
(0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0182) (0.0148)
2.1565 *** 1.1949 *** 1.8844 *** 1.6383 ** 1.1712 ***
(0.2999) (0.3707) (0.4971) (0.6629) (0.4300)
1.4783 *** 1.2366 *** 1.5419 *** 0.7637 0.9348 **
(0.3406) (0.3882) (0.4742) (0.6240) (0.4269)
1.2957 *** 1.8665 *** 1.6252 *** 0.5960 1.0064 ***
(0.3023) (0.3786) (0.4496) (0.6386) (0.3625)
-0.7158 *** -0.3996 -0.2686 -1.2926 *** -0.7001 **
(0.2312) (0.2952) (0.2737) (0.4561) (0.2986)
-0.3046 *** -0.2133 *** -0.2822 *** -0.2772 *** -0.1963 ***
(0.0164) (0.0143) (0.0225) (0.0331) (0.0188)
-0.0985 *** -0.0764 *** -0.1014 *** -0.1232 *** -0.0589 ***
(0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0314) (0.0165)
0.0070 -0.0256 *** 0.0017 -0.0342 -0.0055
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0134) (0.0252) (0.0138)
0.1087 *** 0.0508 *** 0.0996 *** 0.0480 *** 0.0700 ***
(0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0173) (0.0101)
0.0012 0.0013 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0064) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0012 *** -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.307 0.444 0.349 0.651 0.523
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).








0.1117 *** 0.0521 ***
(0.0192) (0.0102)
0.1427 *** 0.0743 ***
(0.0194) (0.0104)
0.0238 *** 0.0108 ***
(0.0054) (0.0016)
0.0186 *** 0.0142 ***
(0.0055) (0.0013)
-0.0109 *** 0.0046 ***
(0.0066) (0.0018)
-0.0091 * 0.0002 **
(0.0052) (0.0017)
0.0098 *** 0.0124 ***
(0.0025) (0.0008)
0.0085 *** 0.0105 ***
(0.0026) (0.0007)




0.0820 *** 0.0564 ***
(0.0171) (0.0076)
0.1561 *** 0.1045 ***
(0.0164) (0.0067)
0.1128 *** 0.1064 ***
(0.0175) (0.0077)




















0.0004 *** 0.0020 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001)




AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.573 0.602
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